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1. Introduction 
In 2005 elections for both the parliament and for the presidency took place in Egypt. 
These elections were preceded by a reform agenda represented by Egypt’s president, 
Hosni Mubarak, in the early months of 2005. This reform covered law amendments for 
election procedures and political participation (e.g. Egypt State Information Service 
2005, Hamzawy 2005b, ICG 2005, Dunne 2006). Mubarak has implemented various 
political reforms ever since he entered office in 1981 and on Egypt’s official web pages 
the political reform in 2005 is hailed as the latest step in a row of reforms towards 
democratization:  
Egypt has been a scene of a series of landmark steps to introduce political reforms 
for promoting democracy in Egypt and paving the way for a new phase of political 
work going in line with the economic, social and cultural developments in Egypt 
and world approach on democracy, freedoms and human rights. (Egypt State 
Information Service 2005). 
The reform agenda created some hope for real political changes, both in Egypt and 
internationally (e.g. ICG 2005, al-Jazeera 2005, Middle East Times 2005). In her speech 
at the American University in Cairo in June 2005 Condoleezza Rice proclaimed that 
“President Mubarak has unlocked the door for political change” (Rice 2005). However, 
most scholars and journalists welcomed the reform with less enthusiasm and in the 
aftermath of the elections the law amendments were criticized for being cosmetic 
measures taken to preserve rather than change an essentially authoritarian order (e.g. al-
Amrani 2005, al-Anani 2005, al-Ghobashy 2005a,b, Hamzawy 2005a,b,d, Hamzawy & 
Brown 2005, ICG 2005, Dunne 2006). For the first time in the Egyptian history a multi-
candidate election for Presidency was carried out2, nevertheless Mubarak won 88.6 % of 
the votes (e.g. Egypt State Information Service 2005, Al-Ahram 2005) and he will be in 
office for another six years. The National Democratic Party3 (NDP), the party of the 
President, remains in majority4 in the Parliament. Egypt is a good example of so called 
“hybrid” democracy, where the democratic institutions are in place, however democratic 
                                                   
2 The low voter turnout, officially 23% of registered voters, reflects the lack of faith in the electoral process 
(Abaza 2006).  
3 Established in 1978 in the wake of the establishment of the multiparty system introduced by Sadat in 1977 and 
the ruling party ever since. 
4 311 seats out of 454 (Al-Ahram 2005). 
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policy is lacking. Despite political reforms towards political liberalization in the 
Mubarak era, Egypt is still an authoritarian (semi) corporate regime (Al-Amrani 2005; 
Hamzawy 2006; Dunne 2007).  
The Islamist social movement5, the Muslim Brothers, still not allowed by the 
regime to form a political party6 nor to engage in political activities as a civil 
association7, won 88 seats or 19 % in Parliament in the election in November-December 
2005. This is the strongest showing by an Egyptian opposition party in half a century 
(Hamzawy & Brown 2005) and the Brotherhood is today the biggest and only serious 
opposition “party” in Egypt8. Due to the abovementioned political restraints and control, 
the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood came as a surprise to the regime and the 
secular opposition forces (ICG 2005, Hamzawy & Brown 2005). The result of the 
parliamentary election represents a paradox, namely that the illegal social movement 
Muslim Brothers in an authoritarian and corporate regime showed such huge election 
success. This paradox constitutes the backdrop of this thesis and illustrates that despite 
power structures made by the regime, the social movement is an agent applying diverse 
strategies to circumvent stringent obstacles to enter the formal political system.  
Purpose & Research Questions 
The driving force for carrying out this thesis is to understand the various obstacles and 
opportunities for democratization or political change in Egypt, and in the Middle East in 
general. Lack of democratic policy is again a major hindrance for sustainable 
development in the region (Arab Human Development Report 2004)9. The Muslim 
Brothers is today, despite its illegal status, the biggest opposition party in Parliament; as 
well as the best organized and widespread organization in Egypt. It is a non-violent 
organization applying existing political structures attempting to achieve influence for 
                                                   
5 The definition of the organization Muslim Brothers as an Islamic social movement will be discussed in further 
detail in the background chapter of the Muslim Brothers. 
6 Law 40 of 1977 
7 Law 32 of 1964 
8 Even more striking was the rate of success; sixty-one percent of the 144 candidates nominated won. The result 
represents “a six-fold increase over their 2000 showing of seventeen seats” (Hamzawy & Brown 2005). 
9 See for instance Törnquist (1999) and Elgström & Hyden (2002) for research on the relationship between 
development and democracy. 
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political change by democratic means, even though the regime tries to prevent it from 
doing so. 
Theoretically this thesis is a contribution to the research on “how actors strategize 
to increase their capacity to promote political reform in order to combat problems of 
development” (Törnquist 2002). Törnquist (1999, 2002, 2004) proposes three questions 
that are especially central to the analysis of the strategies and capacities of political 
movements. First question is where in the political terrain the actors choose to work, 
second is what issues and interests they promote and politicize; and the final question is 
how people are mobilized into political movements and the political sphere. The thesis 
will focus on the two first questions, as they are intertwined in the case of the Muslim 
Brothers. Their goals partly points out the political space they choose to work in, as well 
as the political context influence and alter their goals again. The last question is already 
answered by the thorough research of Wickham in Mobilizing Islam (2002). She argues 
that in authoritarian settings social movements are most likely to mobilize in 
decentralized structures, and will fail to obtain access to the political system because 
they will face counter-mobilization by the regime (Wickham 2002). This thesis will 
challenge and pursue some of her findings, when it comes to where in the political 
terrain the Muslim Brothers choose to work. There is no doubt that the regime controls 
the political activities of all political opposition, but as I will show, with patience and 
pragmatism the Muslim Brothers have made strategic choices to become the most 
influential political opposition party.  
Even though the thesis focuses on the Muslim Brothers in the formal political 
sphere behaving as a political party, social movement theory frames this research. Social 
movement theory has been applied and developed for a couple of decades; however 
Wickham (2002) and Wiktorowicz (2004) argue that studies on Islamic activism have 
been detached from these studies until recently. Islamic activism is important to study 
both due to its political impact and in theoretical terms, because it raises broader 
questions of opposition movements in authoritarian regimes.  
Inspired by the work of Bourdieu (e.g. Harker et. al 1990, Bourdieu 1990, 1992) 
this thesis will illuminate the dialectic relationship between structure and agency, as 
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neither aspect is sufficient to give the full picture of Islamic activism10. We need to 
know both the constraining structures made by the regime as well as the strategies 
applied by the Muslim Brothers. The recent research of Lust-Okar (2005) will be 
presented to show how studies on structures fail to see the opportunities and the 
capacities of actors to circumvent the existing structures. Further, such research will also 
render the structures more static than what they really are. Lia (1998) calls for more 
research on the political practices and activities of Islamist movements, both to give a 
broader image of Islamic activism as well as understanding the dynamics of 
authoritarian regimes (Lia 1998: 287). 
As I study the Muslim Brothers as an Islamic social movement in the context of an 
authoritarian and cooperative regime, the aim of this thesis is to critically examine how 
the political goals and strategies of Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak era are 
determined by the political context in which they operate. The main research question is: 
How can we understand the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers? The capacities 
of the Muslim Brothers are determined by two factors; the structures and their own goals 
and strategies. This research is guided by two sub-questions. First, on the agency level; 
how do political obstacles and opportunities in the formal political system affect and 
shape the goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt? This reflects 
Törnquist’s question on what issues and interests the actors choose to politicize. Second, 
on the structure level; why do the Muslim Brothers, despite political and judicial 
hindrances, work within the formal political system? Or in Törnquist’s wording where in 
the political terrain the actors choose to work. A research model on how context, goals 
and opportunities are interrelated is developed in chapter 2. 
Before entering the methodology chapter a brief account on the case and context 
will be represented, to shed light on the long and multifaceted relationship between the 
Muslim Brothers and the regime which will be drawn upon in later chapters. 
                                                   
10 See Stokke (2002) on how to apply Bourdieu’s concepts in the study and analysis of social movements. 
Due to limited space I have to omit a discussion on Bourdieu in this thesis. 
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The Case – The Muslim Brothers in Egypt 
The Muslim Brothers11 is the first modern Islamic social movement and it has been, and 
still is, the role model for modern Islamist movements (Lia 1998). The Muslim Brothers 
as an organization is neither easy to define nor to categorize; Harik (1997) considers all 
aspects of the Muslim Brothers defining it as “a spiritual worldwide organization that is 
(1) a da’wa12 from the Quran and the sunna13 of the Prophet Muhammad; (2) a method 
that adheres to the sunna; (3) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul; (4) a political 
association; (5) an athletic association; (6) an educational and cultural organization; (7) 
an economic enterprise; and (8) a social concept (Harik (1997) referred to in Abed-
Kotob & Sullivan 1999: 45). This thesis will be concerned with the role of the Muslim 
Brothers as a political association, conceptualized as an Islamist movement.  
The thesis focuses on the Muslim Brothers in the Mubarak era; however, this 
chapter gives a brief review of the history of the Muslim Brothers, as the historical 
experiences of oppression and progress is shaping their strategies and goals today. When 
asking the Supreme Guide14 Akif about how he would explain the good results from the 
last election in 2005, the answer was that “it is the accumulation of 78 years of persistent 
work on bringing out the good intellectual, correct understanding of the religion, and 
good social relations” (Akif: interview 02.05.06.). Further, the organizational and 
ideological development in the initial years of the movement is to a large degree 
normative to the organization of today; however under reinterpretation due to the 
contemporary context as will be shown later.  
History of the Muslim Brothers 
The Muslim Brothers was founded in 1928 in Ismailia, a port city at the banks of the 
Suez Canal, by Hassan al-Banna. Starting up as an Islamic welfare organization, the 
                                                   
11 The Arabic name of the organization, transliterated, is Jam’iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, meaning the 
Society of the Muslim Brothers. Short forms are often used, Ikhwan Muslimin the Muslim Brothers, or only 
Ikhwan - the Brothers or the Brethren. The concept Brotherhood is both misleading and might even have 
negative connotations, referring to something closed and clandestine (al-Ghobashy 2005). However, the most 
common name in English is the Muslim Brotherhood. The various concepts will by used interchangeably in this 
thesis. 
12 Literally this means “call” or the “call to Islam” in missionary terms. In the Muslim Brotherhood vocabulary 
the term usually means the organization’s principles and ideas. (Lia 1998). 
13 Tradition and example (Vogt 2005). 
14 The leader of the Muslim Brothers. 
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Muslim Brothers soon expanded their activities to political participation and demands 
for political reform, based on reinterpretations of Islam, to reach their objective of 
“achieving the nation’s goals and ambitions” (Lia 1998: 283, al-Banna: interview 
03.05.06). In 15 years the Muslim Brotherhood developed from a small, rural, Sufi15 
organization for the workers at the Canal Suez Company, to become an international, 
comprehensive movement situated in Cairo (Mitchell 1969, Lia 1998, al-Banna: 
interview 03.05.06.). The charismatic leadership of Hassan al-Banna is often 
emphasized as an important factor for the growth of the organization (Mitchell 1969, Lia 
1998). As Gamal al-Banna said; “this great evolution of the organization was due to the 
ingenious capacity of Hassan al-Banna as an organizer and that he was a man of the 
people; living simple and pious he gained respect and loyalty from a huge segment of 
the Egyptian population” (Al-Banna: interview 03.05.06.). Further, the authority of al-
Banna was based on “personal qualifications and ideology” as opposed to traditional 
norms such as social standing, this principle was normative for all members of the 
society (Lia 1998: 281). This principle is very important taking into consideration the 
hierarchical structure of the Egyptian society at that time and extensive patron-client 
networks (ibid).  The political engagement of the Muslim Brothers in the 1930s was 
highly modern, in terms of political propaganda and activism. They brought politics to 
the people and raised political consciousness through open meetings, newspapers and 
flyers, in contrast to the exclusive and closed political activity of the elite (Lia 1998: 
282). The Muslim Brothers was a pro-Palestine anti-colonial movement, appealing to 
educated lower-middle and middle class effendia16 (Lia 1998: 13, al-Ghobashy 2005). 
Ideologically, the Muslim Brothers interpreted Islam as a source to claim the right to 
political participation of every Muslim and that every Muslim has a duty to confront any 
oppressors (Lia 1998: 283, al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06). The Muslim Brothers 
initiated a process of “practical reinterpretation” of Islam, meaning that the religion 
should relate to “the modern age and all aspects of modern life” (Lia 1998: 286). The 
movement was financially independent (Lia 1998: 281); “Hassan al-Banna said that al-
                                                   
15 Mystic tradition within Islam (Vogt 2005). 
16 Effendi means gentleman (when referring to non-Westerners wearing Western clothes and the fez or 
tarboush). In pre-revolutionary Egypt the Effendia denoted civil servants and white-collar employees from the 
middle classes, educated at non-religious faculties and schools (Lia 1998: 290).  
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Ikhwan al-Muslimun was the poorest association and at the same time the richest, 
because the organization did not get any financial support from the state or any other 
sources, but the large number of members and sympathizers were their capital”. (Al-
Banna: interview 03.05.06). Further, the movement established relations with the local 
aristocracy and members of the ruling elite in order to gain support (Lia 1998: 281). 
“They had a pragmatic approach in the way they were dealing with the King, the 
government and the foreign powers” (Ibrahim: interview 05.04.06). The details of its 
founding and early history reveal that the society was a highly “adaptive political 
creature” (Al-Ghosbashy 2005) and a representative for the people (Lia 1998, al-Banna: 
interview 03.05.06.). 
In the 1940s Hassan Al-Banna and the Muslim Brothers reaches a peak, which 
also leads to its ruin. The Muslim Brothers had become such a huge organization with 
substantial popular support that it constituted a threat to the regime and the movement 
was met with several counterattacks from the regime. The Brothers had 500 000 active 
members and as many sympathizers and 500 ‘shu’ba’, branches, around the country, as 
well as branches in Palestine, Algeria and Syria (Mitchell 1969; Gamal Al-Banna, 
interview 03.05.06.). The branches were transformed into social meeting places 
providing library and social activities. The branches had a parallel system, one for social 
services, as health and education; and one providing spiritual information and political 
awakening. The idea of Hassan al-Banna was that the spirit of Islam can cover all 
aspects of society, whether it is political, social, or spiritual (Al-Banna: interview 
03.05.06.).  
In addition, the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun provided sports activities, including 
military training. The military group of Ikhwan, a special force, was trained as an 
army and many were officers from the Egyptian army, one of them was Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, who later carried out the Free Officers’ Coup in 1952 and became 
the first president. The initial idea to establish this army was to protect the 
Palestinians from invasion and when Israel was proclaimed independent in 1948, 
volunteers from Ikhwan Muslimin were sent to Palestine to fight. They reached 
Israel long before the national official army of Egypt, and they proved stronger than 
the Egyptian army. The Egyptian government could not tolerate this military 
superiority and the popular support of the Ikhwan. The government banned and 
dissolved the Ikhwan in December 1948. The conflict between the regime and the 
organization accelerated in 1949, culminating in the murder of Hassan al-Banna 
(Al-Banna: interview 03.05.06.). 
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After the coup in 1952 the Free Officers wanted to make deals with the Muslim 
Brothers, but they turned down the proposition, because the Brothers were not willing to 
compromise their political agenda (Ayubi 1991: 134-135; al-Ghobashy 2005: 377; 
Ibrahim: interview 05.04.06). This disagreement resulted in mutual distrust and in 1954, 
after an attempt to assassinate Nasser, the Muslim Brothers was totally banned and 
thousands of members, leaders and followers, were imprisoned and tortured for years 
(Al-Ghobashy 2005, Ibrahim: interview 05.04.06, al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06). The 
1950s and 1960s is an era characterized by a lot of tension between the Ikhwan and the 
regime, the Ikhwan attempted to assassinate government officials and the regime 
cracked down all activity of the organization (Ibrahim 1981). One of these prisoners was 
Said Qutb, as he was tortured in prison he developed hatred towards the regime, which 
he claimed was corrupt and evil because of secularism and westernization (Baker 2003, 
Kepel 2003, al-Ghobashy 2005). He was inspired by al-Mawdudi, the ideological father 
of Political Islam and in prison Qutb wrote the (in)-famous book Ma’alim fi al-Tariq, 
Milestones17 (Baker 2003; Kepel 2003). According to Gamal al-Banna: 
 “This book changed the idea of politics and al-jihad, about the aims of an Islamic 
government. The climate was a climate of polarization, not a climate of logic. The 
impression of Ikhwan was completely changed from a reform friendly association 
to a revolutionary organization that claimed al-jihad and to make the governance of 
Allah, this is all the ideas of Said Qutb and not the ideas of Hassan al-Banna. This 
was not even the ideas of Ikhwan, because the Mogad18 at that time was a great 
judge, Hassan al-Houdaiby, he was a man of complete legality, and he did not 
accept these ideas” (Al-Banna: interview 03.05.06). 
Sadat allowed the organization to exist, albeit not as a political party, and many Brothers 
were released from prison, facing an altered Egyptian political landscape open for non-
violent strategies (Al-Ghobashy 2005). Since the 1970s the Muslim Brothers have been 
active in various political activities, in addition to its socio-religious work (Al-Ghobashy 
2005; Ibrahim: interview 05.04.06.). The liberal economic reforms of Sadat throughout 
the 1970s released massive Marxist-oriented student activism, which turned into Islamic 
activism. Many of the core members of the Muslim Brothers were politically engaged 
students in the 1970s (Wickham 2002, Tønnessen 2005). Since the 1980s the Muslim 
                                                   
17 This book is today considered to be one of the most influential sources for Islamic extremism, e.g. al-Qaida. 
18 The Supreme Guide. 
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Brothers have become central political actors participating in elections for both 
Parliament and for national professional associations. 
The Muslim Brothers Today 
In the Mubarak era, the Muslim Brothers has called for gradual change undertaken from 
within the political system, it is noted for its accomodationist approach, with support 
from the Muslim masses, and is the single most important opposition group to 
Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) (e.g. Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999, 
Wickham 2002, al-Ghobashy 2005). Nevertheless, this period is characterized by 
changing strategies of the regime from accommodation and control, which again have 
influenced the Muslim Brothers in various ways. The 1980s was characterized by 
accommodation and progress. Then again in the 1990s the regime launched a 
counteroffensive against all Muslim groups including the Muslim Brothers, accusing it 
of being an illegal organization with ties to extremist groups (Wickham 2002). Despite 
the government’s intensive media campaign against the Brothers, the arrest of several 
prominent Brotherhood leaders before the elections, and attacks on Brotherhood 
candidates and their supporters by security police during the election periods in both 
2000 and 2005, they have remained the strongest opposition party in Parliament.  
The Muslim Brothers, have been central actors in the syndicates and unions since 
the 1980s, in addition to their efforts on parliamentary participation. Under Mubarak the 
syndicates and unions became repoliticizied, because the opposition parties realized that 
they could acquire some autonomy from state domination and the Muslim Brothers has 
been active in applying this political channel (Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999, Wickham 
2002, Abdelrahman 2004, Kassem 2004). During the 1980s the Muslim Brothers had 
gained the majority in the Doctors’ and Engineers’ syndicates. By 1992 it had gained 
“landslide victory” in the syndicate council elections of five of the country’s most 
prestigious and wealthiest professional syndicates, namely those representing the 
engineers, doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, and scientists. Kassem observes that “the 
Brotherhood’s increasing interest in syndicate activities in the late 1980s and early 
1990s went hand-in-hand with the increasingly exclusionary measures imposed by the 
government on legislative elections” (Kassem 2004: 112). After 2000, the Brotherhood 
has experienced some tightening of control of the regime on the professional syndicates. 
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 Gamal Al-Banna told me that he advised the Muslim Brothers to enter the 
professional syndicates as a political strategy; to approach the regime from various 
angles (Al-Banna: interview 03.05.06). Further, he stressed that it is not a coincidence 
that the Brothers entered the professional syndicates and not the labor unions. First, the 
workers’ unions are under stricter guard of the state and fully co-opted. Second, the 
regime would not allow the Muslim Brothers to enter the Labour Unions, because they 
could constitute a serious threat to the nation’s infrastructure (Al Banna: interview 
03.05.06.). Another obvious reason is that the majority of the Brotherhood members are 
professionals. In 2006 the Muslim Brothers tried to enter Labour Unions, but they faced 
massive resistance from the regime19.  
Even though the Muslim Brothers are in majority in many professional syndicates, 
the direct political impact is restricted. Essam Al-Erian, member of the Doctors’ 
Syndicate, finds it challenging to cooperate with the Minister of Medicine because they 
do have a good dialogue and cooperates well, at the same time they have divergent 
political interests (Essam Al-Erian: interview 02.05.06). However, posts in the boards of 
Egypt’s professional syndicates have given the Muslim Brothers an ample opportunity to 
show that they are serious political actors. Al-Houdaiby claimed that many Egyptians 
have realized that “the Ikhwan are not in the syndicates boards for personal privilege and 
they are not corrupt. People know they are sincere, innovative and hardworking” (Al 
Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). The Muslim Brothers got the chance to demonstrate its 
efficiency and organizational skills on a popular level when a major earthquake hit Cairo 
and left 500 people dead and thousands homeless in 1995. The earthquake hit on a 
Thursday afternoon after most government offices had closed for the weekend. While 
the Muslim Brothers reached the disaster areas almost immediately and used the 
Humanitarian Relief Committee of the Doctors’ Syndicate to organize and provide 
medical relief, food, clothing, and other necessities to the victims throughout the 
weekend, government backed assistance did not arrive until Saturday morning. During 
that time both the Doctors’ Syndicate and the Brotherhood-dominated Engineers’ 
Syndicate also set up emergency relief centers and donated money from their respective 
syndicates to help the families most affected by the earthquake. In addition, the 
                                                   
19 See Al-Ahram and IkhwanWeb, among others, for more details on this. 
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Engineers Syndicate used its members’ skills to inspect the safety of approximately 
10,000 residencies before allowing the families to return to their homes (Wickham 2002, 
Kassem 2004). According to al-Erian: 
People support us more and more, due to the lack of the services from the 
government to the population. The government withdraws from several tasks and 
the people want some opponents in the syndicate to express their dissatisfactions. 
We are considered a good and reliable opponent group because we are widespread, 
trustworthy and we have a good program. The others are divided and their political 
program is weak (Erian: interview 02.05.06.)20. 
The movement has undergone great changes, or transformations, both organizationally 
and ideologically (Al-Ghobashy 2005). The movement is a heterogenic group with a 
number of internal challenges, caused by intergenerational differences and “wings” with 
various ideas of organization and strategies (Rashwan 2006). Despite internal 
disagreements, there has been a shift in their ideological plank from politics as a sacred 
mission to politics as the public contest between rival interests (Al-Ghobashy 2005). The 
main goal of the Muslim Brothers is the establishment for a free and fair society. As 
expressed by Wickham: 
Though couched in religious terms, this vision of a better society embodies many of 
the same hopes and aspirations – for freedom from dictatorship and for social 
justice and public accountability – that have inspired secular movements for 
democracy elsewhere around the globe (Wickham 2002: x – xi). 
The Muslim Brothers is a comprehensive movement engaged in several activities. In 
addition to politics they are heavily engaged in promoting social welfare, particularly, in 
the areas of health care and education. The organization and its supporters run schools, 
hospitals, day care programs, job training centers, tutoring programs, Quranic instruction 
programs, after-school programs, and numerous other development and social programs. 
(Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999). As al-Erian said, the Brothers have two main duties 
“serving the people in the districts and being accountable representatives in parliament” 
(Al-Erian: interview 02.05.06.). Further, he stressed that they were not like “a society in 
society, but networks throughout society. This structure is a mixture of political strategy 
and Islamic structure.”  It is sometimes difficult to divide the various aspects of what is 
political and what is social work. At least the social work has a positive effect on the 
                                                   
20 Literature on the Muslim Brothers in the syndicates and unions are e.g.: Özdalga & Persson 1997, Beckman 
& Sachikonye 2001, Abdelrahman 2004, Kassem 2004. 
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political, in sense of mobilization and gaining trust, this is also expressed by Wickham 
(2003). Further, they use non political channels for mobilization, first and foremost 
through mosques and support of education and health care (Wickham 2002).  
The charity work provided from the Muslim Brotherhood is not for political 
purposes; it is there all the time as part of the five pillars. The Quran says: “he is not 
a true believer who goes to sleep knowing that his neighbor is hungry”. There is no 
direct link between the social work and the political activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, the connection is the people recognizing that the Muslim 
Brotherhood really serves them. On the other hand working on the grassroots level 
gives members of the organization the opportunity to meet people and get to know 
about their daily challenges. This interaction with the people gives an idea of reality 
and our politics stems from reality (Al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
The Muslim Brothers mobilizes from all layers of society, from rural farmers, to 
educated lower-middle and middle urban class, and lately from the upper classes (Kandil 
2005). However, the majority of the members and the supporters are educated middle-
class professionals. According to Wickham (2002): 
 The prototypical Islamic activist is not an illiterate peasant or laborer, but a young, 
upwardly mobile university student or professional, often scientific or technical 
degree. Far from embodying the defensive protest of traditional social classes on 
the decline, the Islamic movement is strongly associated with the most “modern” 
citizens in Arab societies (Wickham 2002: 2).  
According to al-Houdaiby, being a Muslim Brother member does not mean that all their 
activities are linked to the organization: 
Being a brotherhood member does not mean that I am 24-7 brotherhood. I am 
member in several organizations and even though I tell my Brotherhood friends to 
participate in some workshops etc. does not make it a brotherhood organization. 
The same applies if I run a charity organization, the brotherhood can give financial 
support because we work together and we have the same aim and intention, but that 
does not make it part of the brotherhood” (El Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). 
Despite their popularity and comprehensive activities, the Muslim Brothers keeps a low 
profile. Their Headquarter is a flat in a middle class area, al-Manyal, which is an island 
on the Nile just south of the city centre. The only indicator that the flat is connected to 
the Muslim Brothers is a small plate on the wall in the staircase with their name written 
in Arabic and English. This headquarter is illustrative to the Muslim Brothers strategy, 
they have a popular image and at the same time do not show any sign of power, avoiding 
to threaten the regime. Despite their discrete appearance the regime keeps an eye on 
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their activities constantly. At any time civilian policemen sit outside the headquarter 
registering everybody visiting and leaving the building. My informant chose to park his 
car far from the entrance, so that the police would not register his car.  
The Context – The Formal Political System 
This chapter will give a general outline of the political context and the political system 
that the Muslim Brothers operates in. 
The Formation of the Political System 
The Egyptian constitution, adopted in 1971 and amended in 1980, declares that Egypt is 
an Arab republic with a democratic system (Egypt State Information Service 2005). The 
executive authority is the President. Until 2005 he was elected by popular yes and no 
referendum, however the law amendments in 2005 opened up for multi-candidate 
presidential elections, however with strict control of the selection of candidates21. The 
current president, Hosni Mubarak, in office since 1981, was elected for another six 
years. The president formulates and supervises the implementation of general state 
policy (Egypt State Information Service 2005). The President has constitutional power 
to appoint the cabinet; the ministers and their deputies, and further to relieve them from 
their posts (Kassem 2004).  
The legislative branch is the People’s Assembly (Majlis al-sha’b), the lower house 
of Parliament, which approves the general policy, new laws, the budget and the 
development plan. The People’s Assembly is made up of 444 directly elected members 
and 10 members appointed by the President, who serve for a five-year term. The upper 
house of Parliament, the Shura Council, functions as a consultative council, established 
in 1980 to “widen the circle of political and democratic participation” (Egypt State 
Information Service 2005)22. It offers advice and consultation, and proposes new laws 
                                                   
21 The amendment stipulates that party representatives and independent candidates will be able to run for 
president in the 2005 election. Independent candidates need to collect 250 signatures from the members of 
the Shura Council (upper house of the parliament), People's Assembly (lower house of the parliament), 
and municipal councils. Currently, the NDP dominates all of them. Candidates from existing parties will 
not need to meet any conditions. To run in the 2011 presidential elections, however, a candidate must be 
from a party that has been legally active for at least five consecutive years, and whose members have in 
past elections won at least 5% of the seats in both the People's Assembly and the Shura Council (ICG 
2005).  
22 A similar council also existed prior to the 1952 revolution. 
 13
and regulations to the People’s Assembly (Egypt State Information Service 2005). 
Formally, the Egyptian government has complete control over the religious 
establishment. The Government appoints the heads of all three main Islamic institutions; 
Al Azhar23, Dar el Ifta24, and the Ministry of Religious Endowments, which in turn 
“control all other Islamic structures for education, research, dissemination, and fatwas25” 
(Kodmani October 2005). This is a complex constellation characterized by 
interdependence, competition, and muted struggle (Kodmani 2005). According to 
Kodmani, the government maintains an intricate and dynamic relationship with the 
religious establishment.  
At times, the state leans on the Islamic establishment to support its policies, and the 
religious establishment likewise seeks – and receives – the support of the 
government to reassert its full control on religious affairs when needed (Kodmani 
2005).  
In many occasions the secular regime appears as more religious conservative than the 
religious opposition. Ever since the Muslim Brothers was established in the 1920s, the 
relationship between them has been tense. Al-Azhar has, “since the nineteenth century, 
been under the state control, and hence has acted as a formal legitimizer for successive 
ruling elites” (Ibrahim 1981: 35).  
The judiciary is exercised through four categories of courts of justice; the highest 
judicial body is the Supreme Constitutional Court. The judiciary is under the control of 
the government. Administratively, Egypt is divided into 26 Governorates, each headed 
by a Governor who is appointed by the President. Local Popular Councils are elected 
bodies that work with local government administrative units at various levels. The local 
election and rule are of an arbitrary nature under state control, the elections that were 
supposed to take place in 2005 are still postponed. With its large bureaucracy and a 
powerful security apparatus, the Egyptian government is able to respond effectively to 
security threats and ensure public order.  
                                                   
23 Al-Azhar is the oldest operating university in the world, built around year 1000. It is a renowned Sunni 
University in Middle East and center for Islamic scholarship and education (Kodmani 2005).  
24 Dar el Ifta is formally recognized as the only source of fatwas (see next footnote), although this is not the case 
in practice, in an attempt to centralize issuing of fatwas (Kodmani 2005). 
25 Statement from a mufti, legal opinion (Vikør 2005) based on Shar’ia. 
 14
The formal political structure in Egypt has changed considerably since the military 
coup d’etat in 1952 (Kassem 2004), the birth year of today’s regime. The bloodless coup 
d’état was carried out by a group of young army officers, the Free Officers, that 
overturned the constitutional monarchy and in 1953 declared Egypt a republic (Kodmani 
2005, Dunne 2006). The first president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, successfully negotiated 
the evacuation of British forces from Egypt in 1954 (Kodmani 2005). The Free Officers 
abrogated the 1923 Constitution26 and abolished all political parties (Dunne 2006). The 
Nasser era was characterized by independent national development, central planning and 
a leading role for the public sector in development, followed by a populist-socialist one-
party political system, the banning of political opposition, and the linking of mass 
organizations to state organs (Abdelrahman 2004; Kassem 2004; Majed 2005). Further, 
Nasser made education free, not only in the primary and secondary years but at the 
university level as well (Baker 2003). This was an opportunity for lower-middle and 
middle class urban families to expand their possibilities, and for social mobility. In 
addition, university graduates were guaranteed jobs in the public sector (Baker 2003).  
Majed (2005) argues that after the 1967 defeat27 there was a growing discontent 
with Nasser’s socialist project. “The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the emergence of a 
protest movement calling for freedom and democracy, and the formation of secret 
political organizations, Arab nationalists and Marxists among them.” (Majed 2005: 11). 
When Sadat came to power in 1970 he made an ideological turn towards economic and 
political liberalization and Sadat expressed his political vision on four pillars. The first 
pillar was economic liberalization, formulated as the Infitah, the Open Door Economic 
Policy28 (Ibrahim 1994). Two pillars were related to foreign policy; a strategic shift in 
global alignment from East to West, and reconciliation with Israel (Ibrahim 1994). The 
fourth pillar was “a limited political opening toward a more pluralistic democratic 
                                                   
26 The 1923 Constitution is considered the most democratic Constitution in Egypt’s history. The greatest 
obstacle was the role and power of the king. 
27 The Six-Day War, when Israel, among others, gained control over the Sinai Peninsula. 
28 Law 43 of 1974 
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society, with the promise of more to come” (Ibrahim 1994). This vision was realized 
with the multiparty system in 197729. 
Partial Semi-Corporate Autocracy 
Mubarak carried on the liberalization reforms initiated by Sadat. The reforms are 
characterized as symbolic political liberalization, as well as half-hearted economic 
liberalization (Abdelrahman 2004). The Egyptian economy in the 1980s was in a crisis 
due to the failed economic policy of Nasser and Sadat. Efforts on economic restructuring 
in the 1980s were not sufficient to assist Egypt’s development and in 1991 a 
comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) was 
implemented by law30. ERSAP has made the everyday of most Egyptians worse in 
reduced scale and decreased quality of public services, most serious in fields of 
education and health. Egypt could not longer provide free education and guarantee 
university graduates public jobs. The result is that public education in Egypt suffers 
from serious decay at all levels and the “last decades of the twentieth century saw the 
emergence of an army of “educated proletarians” who drove taxis and served tables, 
while they waited ten years or more for assignment to a low-paying public-sector job.” 
(Baker 2003: 27). 
Egypt in the 1990s experienced a huge increase in the number of NGOs, 
syndicates and trade unions. Yet, Egypt’s civil society is strictly controlled under the 
Law of Civil Association established under Nasser in 196431. According to this law, all 
civil associations in Egypt have to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs 
(Abdelrahman 2004, Kassem 2004). Bianchi argues that Egypt’s rulers “opted for 
strategies of corporatization that are of a more tentative, partial, and inconsistent than the 
“state corporatist” system of Latin America or the “societal corporatist” systems of 
Western Europe” (Bianchi 1989: 20), which means a system with both pluralist and 
corporatist structures, semi-corporate system. Two factors limit the functioning of civil 
associations; first the organization in question is required to abstain from any “political 
activities” (Kassem 2004). The term “political activity” is rather ambiguous and allows 
                                                   
29 The multiparty system will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4 when discussing the role of the 
Muslim Brothers as a political party. 
30 Law 203 of 1991 
31 Law 32 of 1964 
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the ministry to hinder the activities of several actors (Al-Sayyid 1995). Second, the same 
law provides the authorities the right to reject the founding of an organization “if the 
environment has no need for the services of another association.” (Kassem 2004: 89). 
Civil society and civil-political society (associations and unions)32 remains as weak 
under Mubarak as under his predecessors. According to Kassem (2004) the constraints 
of the professional associations have increased since the 1990s and the autonomy of the 
trade unions has been marginalized to such a degree that it is difficult to distinguish 
them from the state. Further, the emergence of independent human rights groups in the 
1980s has resulted in “a new battle for the government in trying to preserve its 
domination of power within civil society.” (Kassem 2004: 105). The Law of Civil 
Associations was amended in 200233 further restricting the legal framework of NGOs. 
The law prohibits NGOs from taking part in political or syndicate activities and 
receiving crucial funding in the absence of governmental approval (Hamzawy 2005a). 
The whole political scene and society in general in Egypt is governed under the 
Emergency Law No 162 of 1958 almost continuously since 1967 (Human Rights Watch 
2003). The emergency law is the most serious strain for democratization which is a form 
of martial law, placing the country in a state of emergency and providing exceptional 
powers to the security forces and the executive to monitor, arrest, and detain those 
suspected of activities deemed threatening to national security (Shehata 2006). Further, 
the laws also restrict the exercise of freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by the 
Egyptian constitution in ways that hinder party efforts to recruit support (Kassem 2004). 
Emergency rule has been continuously renewed every third year since Sadat’s 
assassination in 1981. The emergency law was due to expire May this year and Mubarak 
promised his voters that he would lift the unpopular emergency law if reelected and 
replace it with a more narrow anti-terrorism law. The Sinai bombs in April was an 
excuse to extend the law another two years, however Mubarak had hinted earlier that the 
law would be extended until a more suitable anti-terror law was drafted (Shehata 2006) 
Egypt is a good example on how liberalization not necessarily brings about 
democratization. Crafting of institutions, privatization of the economy and a huge civil 
                                                   
32 These concepts will be defined in chapter 2. 
33 Law 84 of 2002 
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society does not create democracy without democratic rules and policy (Luckham et al. 
2003). Observers of the Egyptian political system (Wickham 2002, Brumberg 2003, 
Abdelrahman 2004, Kassem 2004) argue that controlled liberalization in Egypt has not 
boosted democratization34, but rather produced a new variant of authoritarian rule, 
partial autocracy. Further, Wickham even argues that neither Sadat nor Mubarak ever 
intended to fully democratize Egypt. Egypt and other regimes use the fear of Islamist 
gaining power as an argument to continue controlling the political system, as an excuse 
of the power elite to keep status quo and power. Or in other words: “Arab regimes have 
long invoked the nightmare of anti-Western fanatics taking power through the ballot box 
to frighten the United States and Europe into implicitly supporting these regimes’ 
repressive measures toward Islamist movements.” (Hamzawy 2005c).Brownlee (2002) 
sees a “deliberalizing” trend in Egypt because of the regime’s extensive use of military 
courts and the security forces in controlling opposition parties, elections, Islamist 
activity, civil society and the press.  
Both the regime and the Muslim Brothers are balancing in a thin edge; the regime 
in order to keep control at the same time as keeping the image of a democracy. The 
Muslim Brothers on the other hand works from within the system in order to alter the 
power relations, without threaten the regime too much which will lead to another ruin as 
in the 1940s. As I will show later, this balancing act does not make the regime stable as 
many will contend. One good example on this is that the elections for Parliament and the 
Presidency have been changed from one election to the other in the Mubarak era. Al-
Houdaiby argues that today the regime is threatened by four factors or “disorders” as he 
calls it, which disturbs the stability of the regime of today.  
“One factor is the judges, who call for more independence of the judicial power. 
They are the ones who are issuing the dissolutions or interpretations of the 
constitution and this activity is harming the regime that is why they have been 
treated badly lately. The second factor is the elections. Elections in non-democratic 
systems are just formality, as the elections were before the 2000 election in Egypt. 
However, when the regime is giving the impression of carrying out free and fair 
elections and they don’t it harms and undermine the image of the government. The 
third factor is the media which criticize the regime, especially during elections and 
covering all the attempts on forging the results. The fourth factor is the legislative 
                                                   
34 As opposed to e.g. Korany (1998) who argued that liberalization in Egypt was functioning concluding 
that Egypt was a “maturing democracy” (Korany 1998). 
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body of the state that has the power to exposing and questioning the regime. The 
0regime does not know what to do, in order to keep control.” (Al Houdaiby: 
interview 29.04.06.). 
Research Design & Methodology 
The almost 80 years old Islamic movement, the Muslim Brothers, has been studied in 
various academic fields from various angles. However, studying the political strategies 
of the Muslim Brothers in the formal political system within the theoretical frames of 
social movement is a new endeavor. As I have already referred to earlier, Wickham 
(2002) has applied social movement’s theory in order to understand the mobilizing 
factors for Islamic movements. However, the political opportunity structures remain 
unexplored. This section outlines the design for the study and the methodological 
choices and challenges to answer the research question: how can we understand the 
political capacities of the Muslim Brothers?
Case Study 
The aim of this thesis, as noted earlier, is to understand how the political context 
influences the goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers as an Islamic movement, to 
understand the dynamics between context and goal/ strategy. Yin (2003) has defined 
case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003: 13). Hence, a case study approach is a useful tool to 
achieve extensive and comprehensive account of the relation between the political 
system and the political goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers. 
Qualitative research in general and case study research in particular have been 
criticized for its lack of scientific rigor, especially in terms of generalization. In contrast 
to quantitative research where the objective is to achieve statistical generalization based 
on population or universes, the goal of applying case studies is to expand and generalize 
theories (Yin 2003).  In other words, the generalization is based on analytical and or 
theoretical representativeness and not statistical representativeness (Andersen 1997: 14). 
This ambition, of theoretical generalization, is not guided from the belief of universal 
laws; rather a search for identifying linkages between phenomena and regularities across 
unique variations (Andersen 1997: 10). This thesis will carry out an analysis of the 
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Muslim Brothers in correlation with the Egyptian regime, based on existing theories on 
social movements. In order to generalize, it is important that there is control over 
unwanted variation; to overcome this challenge there has to be a connection between the 
research model and relevant theory (Andersen 1997: 16). I will develop a framework as I 
discuss theory in chapter 2. The aim is not to develop new theories, rather to apply 
concepts and theory to summarize and structure empirical material (Andersen 1997: 69). 
Nevertheless, I will discuss the relevance of existing theory and possible deficiencies.  
I chose Egypt as the site for this research because I studied Middle East politics at 
the American University in Cairo in 2003 and I had basic knowledge about the country 
and had a network that eased my research. In Norway the focus on the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict to a large degree overshadows the interest and research on other countries in the 
region. The complexity of the Muslim Brothers fascinates me and because of its huge 
impact on politics in Egypt the movement is a natural case for the research. Besides, all 
the attention and hopes for the election in 2005, made me want to find out how we can 
understand the political role and the capacities of the Muslim Brothers. 
Data Sources 
A central strategy to uphold the construct validity of the thesis is to apply what Yin 
(2003) calls methodological triangulation, which means collecting and interpreting 
multiple sources of evidence to avoid “subjective” judgment, to corroborate the 
information gathered. The main sources for my thesis was semi-structured open-ended 
interviews, structured questions on e-mail, content analysis of written material and 
former research on the empirical and theoretical field. I spent 6 weeks in Cairo, the 
capital of Egypt, during spring 2006 carrying out fieldwork for the thesis, conducting 
interviews and colleting data material.  
Theoretical literature has been applied both to formulate and construct the 
empirical research model, as well as empirical source to the assessment of the contextual 
constraints on the political capabilities of the Muslim Brothers. Further, books and 
articles were collected in Egypt that I would not have accessed in Norway. The state-run 
English weekly newspaper Al-Ahram, accessible on internet, provided useful analysis 
prior to and in the aftermath of the election in 2005 and further gave important coverage 
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of the political development in the country in general. Al-Ahram is less censored than 
the majority of the Egyptian media because it is published in English. Further, the home 
page on internet of the Muslim Brothers is an invaluable source. It contains both 
breaking news on political development in Egypt, gather analytical articles from 
members as well as external actors, and provides general information on the 
organization. The thesis is also applying information from different think tanks, regional 
and international, writing articles and analyses on Middle East politics including Egypt, 
mainly the Carnegie Foundation, Middle East Report and International Crisis Group.  
Prior to the fieldwork the informants was strategically divided in two constructed 
groups. The first group contains members of Muslim Brothers, as the key source to the 
strategies and goals of the movement. The other category is Egyptian scholars and their 
perception of the political regime and the political role of the Muslim Brothers. The 
questions were specific according to the position and background of the persons 
interviewed, in an open discussion manner. However, as social movement theory is the 
point of departure for my study, my questions were formulated in the vocabulary from 
these kinds of studies as well as my own research model. I focused my questions on 
goals, opportunities and strategies.  
As my point of departure on the fieldwork I visited the American University in 
Cairo, where I obtained a degree in Middle East studies in 2003. None of my former 
teachers were lecturing the semester, so I had to make new and interesting 
acquaintances. I talked to the sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim who provided me with 
insightful information and notes that he had from a seminar on the topic of social 
movement theory and Muslim Brotherhood. Further, I talked to Dr. Hazem Kandil, he 
was very helpful to give me a thorough overview over the political strategies of Muslim 
Brothers and he gave me useful advices for my further research. He also gave me the 
name and number of his former student Ibrahim al-Houdaiby, who became my key 
informant. He is fourth generation of central Muslim Brotherhood member, his grand 
grandfather and his grand father have been supreme guides of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and his father has been a candidate from the Brotherhood to the Parliament in 2000. Al-
Houdaiby assisted me in getting in touch with other Muslim Brotherhood members. 
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Conducting fieldwork implies a set of challenges and unforeseeable situations. A 
major limitation to gather information is language. Most Egyptian politicians and 
scholars speak English fluently and I had only to use translator during two interviews 
and then the informants knew some English, so that they understood my questions, but 
needed help to express their answers. As my Arabic knowledge is very basic, I had to 
rely solely on written sources in English and that is off course a major obstacle. 
However, most official websites, including the website of Muslim Brotherhood has 
English versions and there are several English written newspapers. Another obstacle is 
the access to statistical data. First, because most statistical data are manipulated and 
second, not much data is public. Moreover, the Brotherhood could not give any 
information when it comes to numbers because they are illegal, and hence cannot keep 
record on e.g. members and branches. Another challenge that I faced was the 
informants’ prejudice of me in terms of my agenda and my background knowledge. 
First, most of my informants and especially members of the Muslim Brothers have to 
answer questions about the relationship between Islam and democracy on a daily basis, 
from national as well as external interviewers. So, even though I started my interviews 
to say that I would go beyond this discussion, the interviews circled around these 
questions most of the time, with pre-fabricated answers. Second, my informants 
underestimated my level of knowledge, almost all the answers began with an 
introduction of Muslim Brotherhood and their political agenda and an introduction of the 
regime in Egypt. I experienced several times that they ended their answers where my 
questions had started.  
Conducting fieldwork in Egypt has one huge advantage, Egyptians, like most 
Arabs, are very helpful and do what they can to assist. Ibrahim al-Houdaiby and my 
friend Ashraf Ibrahim, helped me to arrange meetings and to translate. Also people I do 
not know even assisted me. However, Egyptians in general are very busy mainly 
because they have more than one job, because of the low income-level, but also because 
many of the informants had full-booked schedules from early morning till late night with 
meetings and other obligations. However, when a meeting for interview was set, it lasted 
one or two hours with tea breaks and small talk. Another challenge that I did not foresee 
is that I was there during Egyptian spring break, with Coptic Easter, Muhammed’s 
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Birthday and some official national holidays spread out over two, three weeks. Many of 
my preferred informants were absent in this period limiting the actual time to gather 
information and make interviews. I did not meet any problems being woman. 
I also had informal conversations with friends and their family members and 
people in the streets, about the regime and the Muslim Brothers. I realized that a lot of 
conspiracy theories are flourishing and that the propaganda from the national media 
works. Some people reacted like they did not know who I was talking about when I 
mentioned the Muslim Brothers, even if I said it in Arabic. The Muslim Brothers are 
illegal and some would not talk about them, others thought of them as terrorists, and 
some even talked about the existing democracy of Egypt. Everybody in Egypt are 
personally engaged in issues concerning Islam and democratization, hence even 
academics are biased on these issues, making it even more pertinent to let the 
information through a critical filter.  
Criteria of Soundness 
How can the trustworthiness of my project be evaluated? What are the criteria for 
judging the quality of the research design? All research must respond to “canons of 
quality” (Marshall & Rossman 2006). Lincoln and Guba (1985) have proposed four 
alternative constructs, to the positivist terms; validity and reliability, which are; 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. These concepts reflects 
more accurately the assumptions of the qualitative paradigm (Marshall & Rossman 
2006).  
The first construct, credibility means an in-depth identification and description of 
the subject showing the complexities of processes and interactions embedded in data 
derived from the setting that is convincing to the reader. “Within the parameters of that 
setting and population and the limitations of the theoretical framework and design, the 
research will be credible” (Marshall & Rossman 2006: 201). The empirical limitations 
are the political goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers in the Mubarak era (1981 – 
today). The social movement theory provides concepts for the theoretical framework, 
with additional actor-oriented theories for analyzing the background for the strategic 
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choices of the Muslim Brothers. The theoretical framework will be developed and 
operationalized in chapter 2.  
Transferability is the second construct and it refers to what is mentioned earlier 
about generalizability meaning that the findings of the research will be useful to others 
in similar situations, with similar research questions. This is parallel to the external 
validity criteria. Transferability is more problematic in qualitative research than in 
quantitative; however two strategic choices can be made to circumvent these problems. 
First, the theoretical framework will show that data collection and analysis is guided by 
concepts and models from the social movement theory. Another strategic choice is 
triangulation, triangulating multiple sources of data or evidence, the act of bringing more 
than one source of data to bear on a single point, because “any finding or conclusion in a 
case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several 
different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode” (Yin 2003: 98). In the 
chapter on Data Sources the use of triangulation is accounted for.  
The third construct is dependability, “in which the researcher attempts to account 
for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen for study and changes in the design 
created by an increasingly refined understanding of the setting. This represents a set of 
assumptions very different from those shaping the concepts of reliability. Positivist 
notions of reliability assume an unchanging universe where inquiry could, quite 
logically, be replicated. This assumption of an unchanging social world is indirect 
contrast to the qualitative/ interpretive assumption that the social world is always being 
constructed and that the concept of replication is itself problematic.” (Marshall & 
Rossman 2006: 203). For instance, similar research on the Muslim Brothers conducted 
in the 1990s made other conclusion, than I will do today. That is why I question some of 
the conclusions and theories produced by Lust-Okar (2005) and Wickham (2002), 
because the political landscape and the Muslim Brothers were different a decade ago. In 
the chapter on the Theoretical Framework, the dynamics of this case will be considered.  
The final construct, confirmability, captures the traditional concept of objectivity. 
This means that if the logical inferences and interpretations of the researcher make sense 
to someone else. This can be asserted by making the logic and interpretive nature of the 
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qualitative research transparent to others, thereby increasing the strength of the 
assertions. Qualitative research implies natural subjectivity of the researcher shaping the 
research. Nonetheless, this is also one of the strengths of qualitative research, that the 
methods require in-depth understanding of the participants in order to understand their 
worldviews. Geertz (1973) claims that “man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun”. In order to understand this web, the researcher needs 
to interpret the meaning of the informants, perform “thick description”. However, what 
is mentioned in the Case Study chapter, I realized how both I and my informants were 
influenced by prejudges. Further, I have strategically chosen literature and information 
on the internet to substantiate my project. “The researcher’s insights increase the 
likelihood that she will be able to describe the complex social system being studied. 
(Marshall & Rossman 2006: 203). Hence, the more interviews I made and the more 
literature I read, the more balanced the comprehension of the case became.   
The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of five chapters including this introduction. The next chapter 
outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis culminating in a research model that will 
guide the analysis to answer the research questions. The variables, the goals and 
opportunities, of the research model will be operationalized and explained prior to 
developing the model. Then, in chapter 3 the political goals of the Muslim Brothers are 
discussed and analyzed based on the theoretical framework, dividing between the goals 
for reform; systemic goals as well as their programmatic goals. The first sub-question, 
how do political obstacles and opportunities in the formal political system affect and 
shape the goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt?, will be analyzed and 
discussed based on the empirical findings here. In chapter 4 the opportunities and the 
strategies of the Muslim Brothers in the formal political system will be scrutinized to 
answer the second sub-question: why do the Muslim Brothers, despite political and 
judicial hindrances, work within the formal political system? The final chapter will draw 
on the conclusions from the two previous chapters in order to answer the main research 
question: how can we understand the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers? 
Further, the paradox presented in the introduction, that Muslim Brothers as an illegal 
organization is the biggest opposition party, will become more comprehensible.    
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2. Theory 
Before I begin to construct the theoretical framework I want to cite Bianchi’s thoughts 
about the Egyptian society, which reflects mine when I started my research on the 
country’s politics: “Egyptians do not mirror the generally dualistic images that dominate 
our commonsense thinking and social scientific discourse”. After a while of researching 
one recognizes that “our most basic assumptions about the dichotomous nature of 
“capitalist” and “socialist”, “public” and “private”, “civilian” and “military”, “state” and 
“society” are being challenged” (Bianchi 1989: 3). In order to perform the analysis of 
the Muslim Brotherhood I need to stretch some concepts to make them fit the case and 
context. 
In this chapter I will develop a theoretical framework in order to analyze the 
political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood. A couple of delimitations of theory are 
appropriate. First, I choose not to discuss Islamism, political Islam, as the ideological 
basis for Muslim Brotherhood, because it is a wide notion, as well as it does not 
necessarily tell us anything about the practical choices of strategies made by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Further, as Abul Futouh, member of the Guidance Bureau of the 
Brotherhood, expressed in an article “the term “reformist Islam” represents a more 
accurate description of the activities of Islamists movements than “political Islam” (Abul 
Futouh 2006). Behind the religious rhetoric lies a pragmatic attitude towards politics, 
where the political context and socio-economic conditions are of more importance than 
the expressed attitudes (Ayubi 1991, Burgat 2003). I am not searching for a theoretical 
connection between democracy and Islam, but rather to understand what Islamic 
movements do in order to bring about change. Utvik argues that in order to understand 
the depth of Islamism the investigation must “proceed to examine and compare the ways 
in which various Islamist groups have translated the general message of Islamism into 
agendas for reform” (Utvik 2006: 2). Further, goals and ideology are not static, but 
rather changing according to context and time, which will be discussed in further detail 
theoretically and empirically. Second, I have chosen to leave out the notion of civil 
society, as it is too vague and all-encompassing to contribute to the analysis of Muslim 
Brotherhood. As a normative concept civil society is fine, however, not for analytical 
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purposes (Törnquist 2002: 23). Lastly, the concepts democracy and democratization are 
used cautiously throughout the text. The Muslim Brothers are the foremost actors for 
political reform in Egypt towards a predicable and just political system. The Muslim 
Brothers have some restrictions on using the word democracy, not so much because of 
the content, but because of the negative connotations as a Western notion. Nevertheless, 
democratization theories provide useful concepts and thinking tools for analyzing the 
goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers, as they through their goals and strategies 
hope to change the regime from authoritarian to a better society for all Egyptians. 
When studying the Muslim Brothers it is important to understand both the 
structural balance of power which influences their capacities and possibilities as well as 
their strategic practices (Harris, Stokke & Törnquist 2004). In other words, the goals and 
actions of the Muslim Brothers are both determined by “structuring structures and acting 
actors”35. Therefore this chapter will both introduce structural as well as actor oriented 
theories.  This chapter gives a brief presentation of the theoretical basis for social 
movement theory. Followed by the theory of Lust-Okar, focusing on the structural 
limitations for regime change in the Middle East and then propose an alternative model 
on how social movements applies opportunities in the political field. In order to carry 
out the analysis of the political capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood, social movement 
theory contributes with key notions for the empirical research model constructed for this 
purpose. 
Social Movement Theory & Islamic Activism 
The social movement literature, tracing back to the 1960s, is extensive, both in 
theoretical and empirical sense, however it is a relatively new endeavor to study social 
movements outside the Western hemisphere. Sidney Tarrow defines social movements 
as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow 1998: 4). Social movement 
research sheds light on how individual grievances develop into collective actions, 
conceptualized in the mechanisms of mobilizing structures, political opportunities and 
                                                   
35 The concept of structuring structures and acting actors is borrowed from Bourdieu. The theoretical approach 
is inspired by his thinking, but due to lack of space, discussion on the usefulness of his theories for developing 
countries it is left out. See Stokke (2002).  
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cultural framing (McAdam et al. 1996). The academic literature on social movements 
increasingly recognizes the dynamics between the opening or closing opportunities for 
activism and the responses based on recognition and interpretation of these opportunities 
(McAdam et al. 2001, Wiktorowicz 2004). This is important to keep in mind when 
studying the Muslim Brothers. 
Islamic activism can theoretically be considered a social movement, subject to the 
same methods of analysis (Wickham 2002; Wiktorowicz 2004). Social movement theory 
is a unifying theoretical framework for inquiry of Islamic activism (Wiktorowicz 2004). 
Wickham (2002) defines Islamic activism and the Muslim Brothers as a certain subset of 
social movements. First, it is a particular type of social movement, meaning movements 
oriented towards systematic change, as opposed to “issue-oriented” movements. Second, 
it is a movement within an authoritarian political system, where independent political 
activity is restricted by limited freedoms of speech and association. Wiktorowicz argues 
that most studies on Islamic activism have not followed the theoretical and conceptual 
development from research on social movements, rather remained as “descriptive 
analyses of ideology, structure, and goals of various Islamic actors or histories of 
particular movements” (Wiktorowicz 2004). Wickham (2002) and Wiktorowicz (2004) 
argue that the study of Islamic activism, until recently has been detached from the social 
movement field and that the dynamics between social movements and the context 
remain unexplored or downplayed.  
Wickham is especially criticizing grievance-based explanations on Islamic 
activism, not because they are wrong, but incomplete. She refers to two major 
explanatory models which she calls “cultural identity” and “political economy” models, 
which locate the origin of Islamic activism in the grievances in the potential recruits. 
The former refers to the reaction of Western domination over Muslim societies, the latter 
on the secular authoritarian regimes failures in providing economic growth, social 
equality and political rights for their citizens. These models do not explain why the 
grievances are turned into action. Wickham argues that if individuals do not recognize 
possibilities for change based on lack of motivations, resources or opportunities, they 
might abstain from action, no matter how extreme their misery is. (Wickham 2002: 7). 
This is the core of contemporary social movement theory that “contentious” collective 
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action is not merely a result of accumulated structural grievances, but rather the 
movements’ collective action through mobilizing agents, structures, and ideas. This is 
especially interesting when collective action is under strict scrutiny of the state.  
As a social movement the Muslim Brothers represents some kind of an anomaly 
because contemporary social movement theory links the rise of movements to the 
opening of formal political institutions and/ or the realignment of political institutions 
elites to the advantage of challenging groups. However, the Muslim Brothers choose to 
mobilize and operate in a very restricted political field. It is the aim of this thesis to 
understand how and why the Muslim Brothers operates in the highly restricted political 
system.  
Political Opportunity Structures 
Whether, when and how social movements emerge and develop depends on the 
opportunities and constraints (Tarrow 1998). How the context shapes a movement’s 
trajectories is conceptualized as political opportunity structures. Contemporary social 
movement researchers (McAdam et al. 2001; Diani & Mc Adam 2003) contend that the 
structural models are static and that it is necessary to conceive ‘contentious politics’ as 
processes and dynamic mechanisms. Studying the political opportunities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, I will show this dynamic; however for the sake of analysis I will use the 
term political opportunity structure. The goals and strategies decide whether a 
movement succeeds in utilizing the opportunities. In other words it is not only external 
factors that matter, but also internal conscious choices and agency (Jenkins and 
Klandermans 1995). This refers to the political capacity of a social movement, to 
discover, create and make use of opportunities. McAdam et al. (1996) have identified 
four factors that influence the political opportunity structures for social movements in 
general. The first factor is the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system. Secondly, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments 
that typically undergird a polity. Third, the presence or absence of elite allies is 
determinant to the opportunities. The last factor is the state’s capacity and propensity for 
repression (McAdam et al. 1996: 27). These factors will be operationalized in the next 
chapter on the theoretical framework. Wickham argues that during the Mubarak era the 
political system is characterized by few opportunities for change: 
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Authoritarian elites remained unified, the vast internal security apparatus of the 
state remained intact; and while a few opposition parties were legalized, the ban on 
the Muslim Brotherhood remained in place. In sum, we find coherent authoritarian 
elite with both the desire and the institutional arsenal to block Islamic opponents 
from challenging their grip on power.” (Wickham 2002: 12).  
How can we understand the Muslim Brothers efforts to operate in the formal political 
system? To answer this question we need to look at two aspects; how the Muslim 
Brothers read, manage and alter the political opportunities and second what issues and 
interests they politicize? 
The Political Terrain 
Where in the political terrain does the Muslim Brothers position themselves? Törnquist 
has elaborated a model to visualize the political space in which various political actors 
operate. He contends that the political terrain has three structural bases. “These are the 
major and often overlapping ways in which societal activity is organized on the central 
as well as local level: state & government, business units (from small farms to big 
corporations) and self-government & management.” (Törnquist 2002: 35). See Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The Political Terrain.  
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This thesis is concerned with the central level of the political terrain. Between 
these three bases is the public sphere, or rather central sphere. This sphere is not always 
public in the sense that it is not necessarily transparent and open, rather private and 
hidden. This space is again divided in three parts. First, the political society, which 
refers to a country’s national representative institutions in which legal political parties 
compete for power (Linz & Stepan 1996: 8, Törnquist 2002: 37). The activities in the 
political society are directed towards the state and the government. Here it refers to the 
Egyptian parliament and the legally constituted political parties that participate in 
parliamentary elections. Borrowed from Wickham (2002), I choose to call the political 
society the “center”. Next is the civil society, “periphery”, which is actual associations  
relating primarily to business and self-management units encompassing all other 
potential arenas for collective action; social, cultural and economic groups, institutions, 
and networks that enable citizens to participate in public life, but do not compete for 
political power. Finally, civil-political societies, the “semi-periphery”, combine or link 
the activities that relate to state, on the one hand, and business or self-management, on 
the other. Comprising the major occupational or professional interest groups (for 
example, labor unions, student unions, professional associations etc). Wickham contends 
that uneven political liberalization under Mubarak created a political system with a 
hollow center and a dynamic periphery36, meaning that the formal political system 
remained controlled from above, while there emerged a vast network of Islamic 
institutions with de facto autonomy from state control. Therefore, she extends the 
concept of opportunity structures beyond the field of formal political institutions and 
elites to the “periphery”. The Muslim Brothers operates in the public sphere in all three 
aspects, but this thesis will focus on how the Muslim Brothers operate in the political 
society37. In the 1980s and 1990s the Muslim Brothers could relatively freely contest for 
leadership positions in the interest-group associations of Egypt’s new middle class, 
while electoral competition for seats in parliament remained tightly controlled from 
above. Nevertheless, this thesis will argue that there are political opportunity structures 
in the “center” and that the Muslim Brothers are strategic agent taking advantage of 
                                                   
36 This relates to “glocalization” theories. See e.g. Cox (1997) and Harris, Stokke & Törnquist (2004). 
37 For thorough studies of the Muslim Brothers in the civil-political society see e.g. Bianchi 1989, Wickham 
2002, Kassem 2004, Abdelrahman 2004. 
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these opportunities. I will find out why the Muslim Brothers find it worthwhile to 
operate in this hollow “center”. 
Studying social movements in authoritarian regimes require a definition on how 
the regime restricts and limits political freedom in order to understand where 
opportunities and obstacles for social movements exist in the “center”. How can we 
theoretically define the authoritarian regime? Lust-Okar (2005) argues that formal 
institutions matter in authoritarian regimes, in opposition to those who claim that 
institutions are weak under authoritarian regimes and of less interest. Further she argues 
that various institutional rules are used by authoritarian elites to create and maintain 
various relationships between the state and political opponents and among various 
opposition groups themselves. (Lust-Okar 2005: 1). This argument corresponds to the 
theory that divides between democratic institutions and democratic policy (Törnquist 
2002; Luckham et al. 2003). Lust-Okar divides between two set of rules that control the 
opposition. The first set of rules is the “divided Structure of Contestation” (divided SoC) 
(“semi-open”), which allows some groups to participate legally in the formal political 
system while excluding others. In other cases, the incumbents treat the opposition 
equally, either inside or outside the political system, so called inclusive or exclusive 
unified Structure of Contestation (unified SoC) (Lust-Okar 2005: 38-40). Egypt has 
experienced both kinds of structures of contestation; during Nasser and partly under 
Sadat the political system was characterized by exclusive unified SoC (“closed”), with 
the introduction of multiparty system under Sadat and the era of Mubarak is defined as 
divided SoC (“semi-open). See figure 2. 
Lust-Okar argues that divided SoC is the most stable system, because the 
incumbents are balancing the strength of included and excluded opposition groups. 
When some political opposition groups are allowed to participate in the system, while 
others are barred, incumbent elites may be able to continue to provide limited rights 
while thwarting further demands. These limited rights for the legal opposition make 
them more dependent on the regime hence also supporting them in suppressing the 
illegal opposition. Brumberg (2002) supports this argument. He argues that the threat 
perception lies in the very logic of partial autocracies which he calls the divided SoC, 
which “to endure, they must implicitly or explicitly allow some opposition forces certain 
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kinds of social, political, or ideological power – but things must never reach a point 
where the regime feels deterred from using force when it deems fit” (Brumberg 2002: 
58).  
 
Figure 2. Structures of Contestation. 
Lust-Okar argues that the legal opposition will be less interested in calling for 
radical political or economic reforms because they are dependent on the support of the 
regime for their legal status. The benefits of accommodation outweigh the costs 
(Brumberg 2002). Tied to the incumbent regime and thus unable to press for radical 
change, the included cannot take full advantage of increased popular discontent, 
accompanying e.g. economic crises. In contrast, excluded political contenders capitalize 
on economic difficulties and expand their popular support.  This opposition becomes an 
increasing threat to both incumbents and moderate opponents. Legal opponents, fearing 
that illegal forces may exploit any political instability to press their own demands, 
become unwilling to mobilize against incumbents. Thus, where a sharp division exists, 
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between included and excluded political opponents, included may become less likely to 
protest and cooperate with the illegal.   
Further, divided SoC are characterized by cycles of opposition demands. It is in 
the very nature of these regimes to have waves of opposition demands, other groups 
threaten to join in, and moderate demands are weakened. As Sidney Tarrow (1998) has 
observed, a movement’s very success can lead to instances of counter mobilization by its 
opponents, changing the environment in which the movement had initially thrived. In 
Egypt both the regime and the Muslim Brothers are balancing between gaining power 
and not create discontent.  
During the 1980s the legal opposition cooperated with illegal parties, first and 
foremost the Muslim Brothers, and capitalized on the popular discontent and demands 
for reform for mobilization and to gain support. In its progression from unobtrusive 
activities on the “periphery” to a series of bold electoral challenges close to the political 
center, the Islamic movement “ultimately reached the limits of the regime’s tolerance” 
and “provoked a massive counterattack by government authorities” (Wickham 2002: 
17). On the eve of the 1990s President Mubarak made it clear to the legal opposition that 
creating such situations or joining with excluded groups to pressure the regime was 
unacceptable. Mubarak had earlier granted the Brotherhood unique privileges, allowing 
it to organize openly while refusing to legalize it. However, by the mid 1990s, Mubarak 
took advantage of the illegal status of the Brotherhood to repress it as well as groups 
such as the Socialist Labour Party that were cooperating with it. The Mubarak regime 
closed off opportunities for electoral competition within Egypt’s interest-group 
organizations and targeted the Brotherhoods’ most dynamic leaders in a new wave of 
repression. Without support from broader sectors of the mass public and without the 
desire or capacity to attempt a revolutionary challenge, the Brotherhood was temporarily 
paralyzed by the regime’s crackdown. The institutional structure allowed Mubarak to 
divide the opposition, creating dynamics that were more violent. As the crisis continued, 
the moderate opponents became less and less willing to challenge the regime.” (Lust-
Okar 2005: 172-173). In sum, while the pillars of the authoritarian state intact, the 
Islamists’ ascent remained contingent on the regime’s forbearance, and the more visible, 
influential, and outspoken the Islamists became, the more likely it was that this 
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forbearance would be revoked.” (Wickham 2002: 18). However, the Muslim Brothers 
did not give up by the repression in the 1990s and as will be discussed later, the Muslim 
Brothers made new plans to still challenge the regime and gain support from other 
opposition groups. 
Lust-Okar argues that political liberalization is not necessarily a process, 
criticizing modernization theorist and neo-liberalists claiming that political liberalization 
is a unilinear process moving toward either democratization or revert to more closed 
system of authoritarianism. She refers for instance to the argument of  Przeworski “that 
although incumbents choose liberalization in the attempt to maintain their regime, such 
contingent or partial liberalization is usually instable because of the “thaw” principle: “a 
melting of the iceberg of civil society that overflows the dams of the authoritarian 
regime” (Lust-Okar 2005: 4). The introduction of democratic institutions does not create 
democracy if the multiparty system, elections and the civil society is controlled 
(Brumberg 2002). Brumberg suggest that guided pluralism (liberalized autocracy, partial 
autocracy) is not only a “survival strategy”, but rather a type of political system “whose 
institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization” (Brumberg 2002, 
56).  
The Lust-Okar model tells a lot about the political system that the Muslim 
Brothers operates in, however it is too rigid. As I will show later is that there are legal 
opposition groups that cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood. And if we take the 
election law as a means for control for the stability of the regime it fails, because not one 
election has been like the other, in changing election laws, electoral surveillance and 
constellation of party allignments. However, there is no doubt that there are cycles and 
that the openings of the system might as well be strategic choices of the regime instead 
of deliberate efforts on democratization. Wickham argues, in contradiction to Lust-Okar, 
that the shift from “closed” to “semi-open” systems constituted a dilemma, as the 
reforms intended to bolster the authoritarian regime had the unintended effect of 
increasing the resources and opportunities available for organized challenges from 
below. 
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Before we resume to the next chapter Wickham’s account on the political system 
is still valid: 
Even after some opposition parties were legalized in 1976, contestation for power 
within Egypt’s formal political system was still controlled from above. For 
example, the Muslim Brotherhood remained banned and was prohibited from 
running its own list of candidates for parliament; members of the Brotherhood who 
ran as independents or as affiliates of legal parties were routinely intimidated and 
harassed; and under the country’s emergency law, it was illegal for Brotherhood 
members to disseminate their literature or assemble in public without permit.” 
(Wickham 2002: 12). 
Why are they still in the game despite the restrictions and harassment? To operate in the 
“center” represents two dilemmas; first the judicial system hampers the access to the 
political society and second; the political society does not have any real political power 
and hence not an obvious arena for influence. 
Means and Ends 
How can the interests and goals of the Muslim Brothers be decisive for their strategies? 
How can we assess their interests and goals? Törnquist (2002) claims that the ideas and 
interests that that the movements focus on signal what aims they will reach for and what 
means they will apply in order to reach these aims. He suggests that there are three kinds 
of ideas and/ or interests that movements focus on. It is the single issues and/ or specific 
interests, ideologies and/ or collective interests and moral/ spiritual values. The Muslim 
Brothers embrace all of these ideas and interests; expressed in their program 
“Development, Reform and Revival”. I will return to the details of the program in 
chapter 3.  
In his studies on democratization Törnquist (2002) separates the universal ends or 
principles of democracy from the contextual means that vary over time and with the 
balance of power. Further, he claims that the political opportunities decide whether 
actors apply existing institutions and rights in order to obtain political influence. If the 
quality on rights and institutions is weak or does not make sense/ have any substantial 
meaning to the actors, they will try to circumvent the democratic channels in order to 
achieve their goals, so called bypass, for example corruption and terror. This is 
visualized in Figure 2. “It remains to be seen what avenue the Brethren will take to 
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bypass the most recent restrictions, but if earlier patterns are any indication, protests will 
remain confined to legally accepted channels.” (Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999).  
 
Figure 2. Means and Ends 
When studying a political party or movement in a partial autocracy it is necessary 
to understand the electoral logic; an authoritarian context will alter party behavior and 
objectives (Mainwaring 2003). As Scott Mainwaring states; “rational party leaders will 
not make vote maximizing their first priority if votes are not the primary currency of 
politics.” Further, he argues that many actors hope not only to obtain a change in regime, 
but rather a change of regime (Mainwaring 2003). Mainwaring argues that parties in 
authoritarian regimes play “dual games”: an electoral game with the objective of 
winning votes and seats, and a regime game. The regime game can either be steady 
participation with the hope of effecting a transition to democracy or a delegitimation 
game where parties work to undermine the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. This 
reflects the various means in Törnquist’s model; actors can either follow democratic 
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paths or bypass them. Parties in authoritarian regimes play electoral and regime games 
simultaneously, with the emphasis on the regime game (Al-Ghobashy 2005c: 376). Al-
Ghobashy states that many of the internal factional struggles in parties operating in 
authoritarian contexts revolve around which games to prioritize and how to balance the 
regime and electoral games. “Seen in this light, parties are by definition dynamic 
organizations in perpetual transformation, and religious parties are no exception.” (Al-
Ghobashy 2005c: 376). We will return to these internal challenges in chapter 3. 
Lust-Okar argues that in divided SoCs, incumbents actually benefit from the 
existence of radical ideological opponents poised to exploit political unrest. Because 
incumbents have manipulated the costs of opposition, these groups pose a threat to the 
legal opposition (Lust-Okar 2005: 173). Lust-Okar writes about the legal moderates and 
illegal radicals, without looking to reality. It is in the interest of the regime that the 
illegal opposition promote radical ideology, in order to excuse their excluded position 
and to gain support from the legal opposition. (Brumberg 2002). That is why the regime: 
rejects the distinction between violent extremists and moderates, choosing to ignore 
all evidence that distorted militant views of Islam can be corrected by reliable 
centrist understandings of the Faith. It also refuses the notion that the roots of 
terrorism lie in the despair caused by the failure of polities for economic and social 
development that leave even educated youth without real prospects. (Baker 2002: 
17). 
The Muslim Brothers have revealed this effect and therefore they do try not to seem 
radical even though they are making hard claims on the regime for political change. The 
MB are working hard to show that they are not radical, but pragmatic and talking of the 
general interest of the people. 
The driving force for the Muslim Brothers and their supporters stems from the fact 
that “Islamists promoted a new ethic of civic obligation demanding that every Muslim 
participate in the Islamic reform of society and state, regardless of the benefits and costs 
incurred by those involved” (Wickham 2002: 15). Because the interest of the nation is 
bigger than the individuals, they are insistent on enduring the harassments and 
restrictions.  
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Theoretical Framework 
In Egypt and the Middle East in general, authoritarian elites have cautiously 
experimented with political reform, permitting the resurgence of independent political 
activity in some arenas while continuing to suppress it in others, as we saw in Lust-
Okar’s model. However, the opposition does what it can in order to circumvent these 
structures made by the regime and invents different solutions. One of Lust-Okar main 
propositions is that the legal opposition parties are more willing to keep their legal 
position and restricted political influence; hence the existing system rather than 
cooperate with the illegal opposition threatening the regime. Social movement theory 
suggests that grievances are not sufficient for movements to politicize their interests, 
opportunity structures must exist in order to motivate for action. In many cases, lack of 
trust in the political system, as a channel for representing interests, may generate 
political alienation and abstention (Wickham 2002). 
“The persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East may have less to do with 
culture and tradition than with the political elite’s desire to preserve its rule and the 
nature of other power relations in the society. This does not mean that social groups 
have failed to mount significant, non-violent challenges to the ruling governments; 
it may only explain why so few have been successful” (Schwedler 1995: 9) 
Operationalization of Approach 
The goal of this thesis is to study the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers in the 
political society. Capacity implies the ability to utilize opportunities. In other words, the 
capacity, their ability to apply the political system in order to reach their goals, is 
determined by two factors; the political context that the Muslim Brothers operates in and 
the political goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers to take advantage of 
opportunities in the political context. 
First, we will look at the political goals of the Muslim Brothers. According to 
Mainwaring, there are two dimensions of political goals in authoritarian regimes. The 
first dimension is change of regime (instrumental aims) and the second is change in 
regime. In authoritarian regimes the former goal is prioritized to the latter, in many cases 
it is even necessary to change the regime in order to make changes in the regime. 
Strategies are methods to achieve the goals (Lofland 1996), but they are canalized by the 
political opportunity structures. Therefore, the strategies of the Muslim Brothers are 
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intertwined with the political opportunity structures. McAdam et al. 2004 claims that 
social movements must be seen as dynamic actors accommodating their context, and as 
the context shifts some of the goals might as well be adjusted to their opportunities.  
The fundamental question, then, is what social movement analysts call the ‘political 
opportunity structure’ - referring to opportunities and hindrances such as the degree 
of openness of the political field, the presence of allies and the risk of repression. 
(Harris et al. 2004: 18).  
As mentioned earlier, Mc Adam et al. (1996) identify four important dimensions of 
political opportunity structures; the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that 
typically undergird a polity, the presence or absence of elite allies is determinant to the 
opportunities and the final factor is the state’s capacity and propensity for repression 
(McAdam et al. 1996: 27). This thesis has operationalized these dimensions into first, 
the state’s capacity and propensity for repression, which means the judicial set of rules 
to control political parties and opposition movements, as well as the state’s use of force 
as deterrent for further political action. The second dimension is the electoral law which 
has been constantly changed in the Mubarak era with various forms of party list and 
independent system. The Muslim Brothers have acted in creative ways to enter the 
political society this way. Legal and illegal political collaborators are the third 
dimension. Interestingly liberal, socialist and center parties have and still do cooperate 
with the Muslim Brothers on various bases. Access to media is the final dimension, 
which have increased its importance for the political work of the Muslim Brothers and 
they also target their information internationally through internet in order to spread their 
messages. I have chosen to focus on three aspects of the political society where these 
opportunities are most present. These aspects are the parliamentary elections, in 
parliament between elections and the access to media. The Muslim Brothers have 
developed various strategies to achieve their goals in line with these aspects of 
opportunities in the political society. 
Research Model of Thesis 
The research model is developed to conceptualize the analytical approach of the thesis 
and incorporate the various dimensions to be explored. The dependent variable is the 
strategies that the Muslim Brothers changes according to their political opportunities as 
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well as the goals. In real life, all concepts in this research are dynamic, but for the sake 
of the analysis, the goals constitute the independent variable in this model. The goals 
and the agenda of the Muslim Brothers have been changing, but the political manifesto 
that they represented prior to the election in 2005, will constitute the basis. To explain 
the insistence of participating in the “center”, which is a highly risky, we need to know 
their political agenda and goals as well as how they circumvent the hindrances.  
 
 
The Political Context 
Goals of the Muslim Brothers 
- Change in Regime: 
Programmatic aims 
- Change of Regime: Instrumental 
aims 
Opportunity Structures in the 
Political Society 
- The state’s capacity and propensity      
for repression 
- Legal and illegal collaborators  
- Election laws 
- Access to media 
 
The Political Capacities of 
the Muslim Brothers 
Figur 4. Research Model of Thesis 
Within this theoretical framework we see a triangle of factors that have a mutual, 
however not equal effect on each other. This reflects some of the critique of earlier 
social movement theory that it is too static (Mc Adam et al. 2001). Despite this volatile 
situation this thesis will look at how the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers in 
the political society are a result from their goals, strategic choices and the political 
opportunities. Now we will look at the political goals of the Muslim Brothers which 
reflects what issues political actors prioritize followed by a chapter on why the Muslim 
Brothers operate in the center.
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3. The Political Goals of Muslim Brotherhood 
The overarching goals of the Muslim Brothers remain the same as the initial goals, “a 
better society for all Egyptians”, but it is evident that the means to reach this state and 
the idea of this society have changed over time, due to internal and contextual factors. 
This chapter will present the dynamics of the ideology and program of the Muslim 
Brothers. Like other reforming parties in authoritarian regimes, the Muslim Brothers 
have a dual set of goals (Houdaiby 2006: interview 29.04.06), or using Mainwaring’s 
concepts; they play a dual game. On the one hand they are working for systemic change, 
or what the Muslim Brothers denotes “development of a political platform”, 
conceptualized as regime game; the Muslim Brothers want a more open political system 
in order to represent their political program together with other parties. On the other 
hand they have a political program based on their ideology and interests, expressed in 
the electoral game. These two sets of goals are interchangeable, in that they are 
represented together in the political program. While playing these games they are 
balancing on a thin edge in order to get as much influence as possible without 
threatening the regime to such a degree that the regime will suppress them. How this is 
done in practice is covered in chapter 4. 
Since the revival of Islamism in the end of the 1970s, Islamic movements have 
continuously reconsidered and reinterpreted their own project (Baker 2003; Rashwan 
2006). The Muslim Brothers has undergone comprehensive reconsiderations regarding 
methods, strategies, concepts and ideas to the conventional Islamic thought (Rashwan 
2006). It is first and foremost the national political development that has influenced the 
organizational and ideological change (Wickham 2002, al-Ghobashy 2005c); however 
international factors have also affected these changes (Rashwan 2006). The Islamic 
terrorism in Egypt in the 1990s followed by the suppression of all Islamic activism and 
the 9/11 have made it more pertinent for the Islamic movement to open up dialogue with 
other parties and propagate democracy (Baker 2003, Hamzawy 2005a, Rashwan 2006). 
The Muslim Brothers is a huge and complex organization, with disagreements about 
organization and leadership, ideology, and political visions, which makes it difficult to 
define and to be general about these aspects. 
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Political Platform 
The goal to change the regime, the systemic goal, is envisioned by the Muslim Brothers 
in their political platform. In short this platform is a political system where all political 
parties can freely compete for power. This chapter will discuss general issues and 
challenges of the Muslim Brothers in accordance with the Political Platform. The 
Political Reforms that the Muslim Brothers wants to bring about to establish the Political 
Platform are discussed in the next chapter. 
Ideology 
The Muslim Brothers is a heterogenic group when it comes to the composition of 
members’ age, profession and geographic background, embracing several ideological 
camps. As an Islamic movement and political actor, we cannot circumvent a discussion 
on why and why not Islamism is the ideology of the Muslim Brothers in relation to their 
political platform. First, I will discuss these internal differences in ideological affiliation 
and then discuss how the Muslim Brothers relates to Islamism. Finally, various 
connotations related to Islamism will be briefly presented to shed light on the 
significance of this notion. 
One source to the ideological discord within the Muslim Brothers stems from the 
various generations within the Muslim Brothers, with various background and 
experiences (Al-Ghobashy 2005c, Rashwan 2006). The highest executive posts are 
seated by the Ikhwan elders, the so-called “prison generation”, who experienced the 
ideological polarized Egypt in the 1940s and spent years in prison in the 1950s and 
1960s. Organizational change and ideological reform is the mantra of the middle aged 
Ikhwan professionals who became political aware on college campuses in the 1960s and 
1970s. They “formulate policy, act as spokesmen, and represent the groups in Parliament 
and professional unions”. (Al-Ghobashy 2005c).  
The organization contains of various ideological “wings”, reflecting to a large 
degree the inter-generation conflicts; arguing for renovation and reconsideration or 
conservation and tradition. In the 1990s this internal conflict on ideology was one of the 
main reasons for the formation of the Brotherhood offshoot Hizb al-Wasat, the Centre 
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Party38, as a reaction to the less reform friendly core of the Muslim Brothers (Ghobashy 
2005c: 386). The conservative wing argues that the Muslim Brothers, as the mother of 
modern Islamic activism, should stick to its traditional ideology and visions (Rashwan 
2006). Another wing is the so called “Renovation Trend”, which attempts to reform the 
Islamic thought and action (Hamzawy 2005a, Rashwan 2006). The main questions are 
leadership and organizational structure; political visions; and the relationship with the 
society and the state. Two central actors within the so called “Renovation Wing” are Dr. 
Essam al-Eryan and Mukhtar Noah, both are former Ikhwan MPs and syndicate board 
members, in the Doctors’s syndicate and the Bar association respectively. Both have 
several times been imprisoned by the regime e.g. al-Eryan was imprisoned without trial, 
a couple of weeks after I met him, in May 2006, for organizing pro-reform protests39. 
This thesis is concerned mainly with the more reform friendly ideology of the younger 
generation, as they get more internal influence as well as they interact more with other 
political and academic actors.  
Another source of ideological discord is the intellectual wave of reinterpretation of 
the so-called  New Islamic School (Islamic modernism/ Salafism) which is inspired by 
the work of thinkers form the late 18 hundred and early 19 hundred; al-Afghani, 
Muhammad Abduh, followed by Rashid Rida, and Hassan al-Banna. Contemporary 
thinkers within this school are al-Qaradawi, al-Ghazzali, al-Bishri, Muhammad Imara, 
Salim al-Awwa and the recent work of Ghannouchi (al-Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06). 
These thinkers brought about the idea of the connection between Islam and politics. 
With this ideology as their ideological basis the Muslim Brothers get inspiration from 
contemporary critical literature. Rashwan (2006) argues that there was a remarkable 
increase of critical studies and research on Islam from the second half of 1980s, which 
was almost absent before40, which the Muslim Brothers adheres to. When it comes to 
                                                   
38 This party is still waiting for a legal status as party. It is a moderate party with both Muslim and Coptic 
members. 
39 He was released in December 2006.  
40 “Among such critical studies from within the Islamic movement were “On the Self Criticism: the Necessity of 
Self Criticism by the Islamic Movement” by Khalis Al-Gabali (1985); “The Islamic Renaissance between 
Inflexibility and Extremism” by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (1982); “The Crisis of Religious Awareness” by Fahmi 
Huwaidi (1988);  “The Islamic Movement in a Whirlpool: Dialogue on Sayed Qutb's Thought” by Salaheddin 
Al-Gurshi (1985); “The Islamic Movement: Future Vision - Papers in Self Criticism” edited and introduced by 
Abdullah Al-Nafisi (1989), and most of late Muhammad Al-Ghazali's works such as “The Prophet's Traditions 
between Men of Fiqh and Men of Traditions” (1990) and “Our Ideological Heritage between Shari'a and 
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ideological role models, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is perceived 
as a political example for many Muslim Brothers: 
 Erdogan is very intelligent and he has the ability to understand the reality, he has 
built a model not on illusions and ideas, but on real facts to work with. Some 
Ikhwan members think that he is not Islamic at all. I think he manages very well; he 
is doing a very good job” (El Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). 
Even though the Muslim Brothers is an Islamic movement, we cannot deduce that 
Islamism is their political ideology, as mentioned in chapter 2. It is commonly held that 
the core of Islamism is the vision of an Islamic state governed by Shari’ah41 42(Ayubi 
1991; Utvik 2006). On a general level Islamism is a very wide and disputed notion, 
encompassing several aspect of political, economic, cultural and social life. Further, 
Islamists call for the establishment of Islamic states is increasingly a matter of symbolic 
language and traditional metaphor (Hamzawy August 2005). When it comes to the 
Muslim Brothers, specifically, their ideology is constantly revised and reinterpreted 
according to the national and global discourses. 
Shari’ah has been central in the political rhetoric of the Muslim Brothers and is 
also incorporated as a thread through the recent political program of the Brothers. 
Nevertheless, the focus on Shari’ah and terminology has undergone a subtle shift in 
recent years. First, the “Renovation wing” of the Muslim Brother argues that on paper 
Egypt is already ruled by Shari’ah because of the 2. article of the constitution, 
proclaiming that “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. 
Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.” (Egypt State Information). 
The main concern of the Muslim Brothers then is not that Shari’ah is not incorporated in 
the national jurisprudence, however the regime does not confirm to it, because, 
according to al-Erian and al-Houdaiby, the regime is corrupt and lacking Islamic values 
                                                                                                                                                      
Reason”, in addition to some significant symposiums such as 'The National-Religious Dialogue' (1989). 
(Rashwan 2006). 
41 There are great divergence of views what rules exactly belongs to shari’ah. However, it is agreed that the law 
is the expression of God’s will for mankind and based on revelation. However, the revelation must go through a 
human intellectual process before it can become a cohesive legal system for society (Vikør 2005: 1). “Islamic 
law is no more than a body of sources of revelation and a methodology for making rules from these sources” 
(Vikør 2005: 1). There are four scholar-jurists who are recognized as the founders of the Sunni legal schools 
(Waines 2003: 63). 
42 A more disputed understanding of Islamism is the alternative way of conceiving Islam as “Religion and 
Muslim Civil Society (Ummah) and not “Religion and Politics”. Gamal al-Banna interprets his brother’s 
view of Islam this way.  
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as guidelines for the policy, meaning that they do not act in the interest of the people 
(Al-Erian: interview 02.05.06, Al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06). One central concern 
of the Muslim Brothers is the double standards of the Egyptian government: 
The Islamic Shar’ia is the principle source of jurisprudence, but still e.g our 
prime minister said on his visit to US last summer (2005) that Egypt does 
not allow parties to be based on religion like the Muslim Brothers, because 
Egypt is a secular country, so he and many others in the government are 
speaking against the constitution and against the people. (Al-Houdaiby: 
interview 29.04.06.).  
Second, the Muslim Brothers does not stress to “implement Shari’ah”; instead it calls 
itself “a civil movement with an Islamic reference (marja’iyya)”. This means that it 
accepts the civil nature of the political system and that it will draw on Islamic teachings 
for its positions – but that it will pursue its goals by working through rather than around 
constitutional and democratic procedures (Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown 2007). Further, 
some movement leaders speak of the “goals (maqasid)” of the Shari’ah, implying that 
Islamic law will provide general guidance to its legislators rather than a set of narrow 
dictates. According to Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown (2007) these general shifts in 
terminology send a message of flexibility, but leave many questions unanswered as to 
how the Shari’ah will provide guidance of policy. Finally, a third shift in relation to 
Shari’ah is that the Muslim Brothers are more concerned with political reform than to 
discuss implementation of Shari’ah. Al-Erian stressed that “first we are concerned with 
political freedom, second socio-economic issues and thirdly Shari’ah” (Al-Erian: 
interview 02.05.06). 
Towards the end of this chapter the various impressions of Islamism will be 
brought up. On the one side, dark shadows of the ideology developed by Qutb, results in 
misunderstandings of the goals and visions of the Muslim Brothers. “Ideologically, one 
of the most visible byproducts of the Ikhwan’s political engagement has been a decisive 
move away from the uncompromising notions of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) as outlined in 
his tract Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Signposts) and toward cautious reinterpretations of the 
ideas of founder al-Banna.” (Al-Ghobashy 2005c). 
Hassan al-Banna wanted a state that conforms to the principles about the good 
world mentioned in the Qur’an. He wanted a state with Muslim measuring for 
things and Islamic political principles, almost equal to democratic principles. He 
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wanted Shura, a council where elites, scholars, and other social groups were 
represented. He wrote an article about the political problems of the Egyptian regime 
from an Islamic point of view, accepting the liberal and democratic constitution of 
192343, based on rule of law. However, he had some reservations about Egyptian 
politics, accusing the politicians for being solely interested in power and lacking of 
political visions for the Egyptian society. In addition he was critical of the electoral 
system, inspired by the critique of a Coptic writer, Meriat Al-Ali. If you read what 
Hassan Al Banna wrote about political change you will think he is a democratic 
reformer, he never mentioned what Said Qutb said later about the governance of 
Allah, never!” (Al Banna: interview 03.05.06). 
Wickham (2002) argues that the former research on Islamism explaining the revival due 
to grievances against the West is wrong. She would rather say that “for most Islamists 
the main priority is not to confront the West but to stimulate a moral, social, and 
political renewal of the Muslim community itself” (Wickham 2002). This is true, 
however, especially after 9/11 and the “War on Terror”, criticism of American or 
Western presence in the Middle East is central in the political rhetoric of the Muslim 
Brothers, questioning the Western notions of Democracy and Freedom, which they 
conceive as hypocritical. (Ikhwanweb 29.09.06). On the other side Utvik studies how 
Islamist groups, Muslim Brotherhood and the Labour party, in Egypt concern 
themselves with economic problems causing frustration in Muslim societies, and what 
remedies they pose. “It seems clear that even though the appeal of Islamism as a 
“symbolic revolution” cuts across classes, the growth in the movement’s following is in 
large part connected to the economic misery and frustrated hopes of educated youth with 
close ties to sections of the population still dominated by the traditional Islamic 
outlook.” (Utvik 2006: 11). According al-Banna the regime is conceived as very bad and 
corrupt, so few people support or trust the regime. “Many voted for al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun, not because they love the Brotherhood, but because they hate the Mubarak 
regime (Al-Banna: interview 03.05.06.). Further, as Hamzay argues, the religious 
rhetoric has a popular appeal: 
“Islamists will never use the adjective “secular” to describe the neutrality of public 
institutions, but they convey identical connotations when they assert the “civility” 
of the public sphere. Nor should Islamists be expected to drop their rhetorical 
emphasis that the teachings of Islam should guide all action, because this emphasis 
maintains the distinctiveness of religion-based political perceptions and sustains to 
a great extent the popular appeal of the Islamists.” (Hamzawy 2005c). 
                                                   
43This constitution was replaced in 1962 by the Free Officers regime.  
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Islamism cannot be understood as the ideology of the Muslim Brothers, even though 
Islam is the very basis for their ideology. First, the ideological reinterpretations of the 
Muslim Brothers leave the question of the role of Shari’ah open for now. Second, the 
Muslim Brothers is not primarily concerned with this issue as they focus on political 
reform.  
The Islamic ideology and rhetoric of the Muslim Brothers have a dual effect. In 
secular Western countries and among the secular groups in Egypt their ideology is 
conceived as conservative and raises uncertainty about their political platform. On the 
other side, the Islamic rhetoric of the Muslim Brothers is connected to identity 
awareness illuminating symbolic issues, among many Muslims in Egypt. Further, they 
are conceived as a modern movement focusing on economic development and political 
opposition. 
Being secular in a Christian society is something different, I do everything for a 
religious purpose, my ethics are fully  religious, I am a management consultant, I do 
not consulting for companies that sell alcohol or cigarettes, I do not consulting for 
American firms, that’s me. I have my principles. (Al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06) 
Organization & Leadership 
The Muslim Brothers are concerned with internal structures as well as how the 
movement appears in relation to the state and society. The appearance is decisive to 
what kind of strategies they should seek and what goals they can achieve, in addition to 
their reliability in relation to the political platform. These two elements of the 
organization, the organizational and leadership structure, and dual role of movement and 
party, will be discussed.  
The organization is illustrative to their relationship to democratic principles. The 
Muslim Brothers has the last decades had internal struggles on the election mechanisms 
and the role of the Supreme Guide. This internal structure is origin to much criticism of 
the Muslim Brothers and their reliability as protagonists for democratic reforms (e.g. 
Wickham 2002, Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown 2007). “A secretive and seemingly 
authoritarian internal leadership structure casts doubts on the Brotherhood’s 
commitment to democratic ideals”. (Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown 2007). The Society of 
the Muslim Brothers is organized in three fractions. The legislative body, the 100-
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member, elected, Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura), is responsible for issuing binding 
resolutions and reviewing the annual report and budget. The council elects the 13-
members of the Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-Irshad), where policies decisions are 
passed by the Shura Council are executed (Mitchell 1969, Al-Ghobashy 2005c). The 
highest executive office is that of the General Supreme Guide (al-murshid al-‘amm), 
who is the chief executive officer and official spokesman of the group (Al-Ghobashy 
2005). The General Guide must be at least forty years and is elected by an absolute 
majority of the Shura Council from candidates nominated by the Guidance bureau (Al-
Ghobashy 2005). In 1992 a provision was added for the reelection of the General Guide 
and terms of office were set at five years, although no term limits were specified (Al-
Ghobashy 2005). “Yet because of the Society’s illegal status and attendant security 
clampdowns, it has been difficult to convene the required institutions in accordance with 
the bylaws.” (Al-Ghobashy 2005c). The selections of the General Guides in the 1980s 
and 1990s have been secretive affairs that followed no clear logic of seniority or 
election. Instead they were shaped by the force of circumstance and internal 
maneuvering for power. A change followed the death of al-Houdaiby at age eighty-three 
in January 2004 with the announcement that the next guide would be selected by a 
majority vote of the Guidance Bureau (Al-Ghobashy 2005c). 
During the 1990s the Muslim Brothers experienced various conflicts between the 
General Guides and the members. The selection of the General guides has cast doubts on 
the movements’ reform will and ideological revisions, both externally and internally. 
The leadership issue was another reason for the formation of the Ikhwan breakaway 
Hizb al-Wasat, the Center party as well as the question of ideology as mentioned in the 
chapter above. The General Guides have so far been from the “prison generation”, with 
less will of cooperation with other parties and most focus on Shari’ah. The Muslim 
Brothers can explain their hierarchic leadership with their illegal status and difficulties 
to carry out democratic principles for electing the General Guide. Further, the status of 
the Brotherhood as a banned organization frequently faced with regime repression has 
imposed a high degree of secrecy in planning and managing political action. However, 
the movement has not undertaken any serious attempts to explain the internal hierarchy 
of authority and decision making procedures of the movement.  
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Another related issue, is the debate on the dual political and religious identity. The 
Brotherhood has kept its dual identity - religious movement and political actor – under a 
single organizational umbrella. This is not entirely by choice: the Mubarak regime 
refuses to allow any Islamist party to register. There are two dimensions of this question. 
First, the internal dynamics of religious movements are very different than political 
parties. Religious movements, by definition, deal with absolutes: issues of good and evil, 
of right and wrong, of faith. They have the right to demand conformity and discipline 
from their members, as long as membership is voluntary. Political parties however make 
decisions, or at least participate in decisions, that affect all citizens. Thus, they must 
respect basic principles shared by all – this is why democratic countries have a 
constitution. They also need to be tolerant of dissent, willing to accept compromise and 
above all willing to accept that they need to follow the laws of the country, even if they 
do not approve of them, that they can only change them by following the established 
process. (Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown 2007). The second dimension is under what 
circumstances the Muslim Brothers would establish a political party. The internal 
paradox is that they wish to be a legal political party, but not under the strict rules of the 
Political Parties Committee (PPC)44, because that will lead to a co-optation of the 
organization.  
The Muslim Brotherhood operates in two tracts as a party and as a movement. In 
the 1970s Sadat offered political legality, but they rejected, because as a political 
party they would be under strict supervision of the state/ government. They felt 
freer as a movement operating around the mosques and in welfare organizations. 
(Ibrahim: interview 05.04.06). 
They wish to obtain the status as legal political party if they manage to develop a 
political platform with political pluralism and participation. Rashwan (2006) argues that 
“the obvious and continuous rejection” of the Egyptian government to allow the 
Brothers to form a legitimate political party release the movement from an internal 
discussion on the future of the movement. However, he states that the dominant 
viewpoint among the “middle generation” is calling for a final decision on the Brothers’ 
organizational “identity” through a full transformation toward the institutional political 
work and the formation of a party that constitutes a complete alternative to the 
                                                   
44 PPC will be discussed in further detail in chapter 4. 
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movement and replacing it (Rashwan 2006). According to al-Houdaiby “the MB is not 
allowed to register as a party according to the party law, it is not our objective“ (Al-
Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.). 
Al-Ghobashy (2005c) argues that the Muslim Brothers is transformed from a 
religious mass movement to what looks very much like a modern political party. This 
transformation has its roots in electoral politicking that began in the 1980s. Despite the 
many internal disagreements, the Brothers have a strong outlook and appear as a strong 
unity in the Parliament, syndicates and unions as al-Houdaiby expressed:
Despite the internal disagreements in the Ikhwan the outlook of the organization is 
very strong, we act as an organization and we all adhere to our democratic internal 
procedures. If we agree on something we all agree on this and we act as one, and 
this is how it is to be a part of an organization, the government knows this so it does 
not make any change. (al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). 
A Democratic Platform? 
The political platform that the Muslim Brothers is aiming towards is a free and fair 
political society, where parties with various ideologies can compete for power. The 
political platform of the Muslim Brothers is based on the ideology of moderate Islamist 
thinkers; authenticate democracy with Islamic concepts (Al-Ghobashy 2005c). So far we 
have discussed some ideological and organizational challenges for the Muslim Brothers 
in relation to this platform. Here some concluding remarks on power and democracy will 
be illuminated before turning to the political reform. 
One central challenge for the Muslim Brothers when they are playing the regime 
game is the question of power. Because they are in the forefront for regime change they 
become the main enemy of the regime. These divergent interests results in the tense 
relationship between the Ikhwan group and the Egyptian regime (Rashwan 2006). The 
Government accuses the Brothers of being merely “power seekers”, by any means, while 
the Brothers claim that the ruling regime is seeking to exterminate them. There are 
attempts on both sides to establish dialogue, but actors from both camps have interests in 
not solving this tension, but rather adding fuel to the fire (Rashwan 2006). It is not only 
the regime that is frightened by the regime game played by the Muslim Brothers, many 
common Egyptians are also unsure about their real intentions, due to both massive scare 
propaganda from the state-run media, that they are terrorists or that they will found a 
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new Iran, as well as the religious rhetoric and the vague and sometimes divergent 
messages from the Muslim Brothers. Al-Houdaiby rejects this scepticism: 
Power is not an end. Power is means. It is not our intention to get power. Second, 
we do not want to impose our agenda, we want to express the will of the people. 
We are a grassroots movement. The interests of the Muslim majority of Egypt have 
clearly been expressed since the first elections in the 1980s” (Al-Houdaiby: 
interview 10.04.06.). 
According to Al-Banna this vision has existed since the initial years: 
Hassan Al-Banna was not interested in authority or power, but he wanted to spread 
his idea. He was not interested in who was in power as long as the broad lines of the 
Qur’an, which is democratic, was followed.” (Al-Banna: interview 03.05.06).  
This issue of “the broad lines of the Qur’an” has been interpreted in various ways, as 
discussed above this can be understood as implementing Shari’ah or in more broad ways 
as based on Islamic values. This is not yet clear. 
The notion democracy is blurred when analyzing the political platform, envisioned 
by the Muslim Brothers. Because the Muslim Brothers identifies this platform as 
democratic, at the same time finds this concept difficult. As I have mentioned earlier the 
concept democracy is not wholly accepted by the Muslim Brothers, even though the 
system they want equals democracy. Ibrahim al-Houdaiby claims that he understands the 
concepts of political freedoms and democracy different than in the Western sense; that 
they are the same procedurally, but not ideologically or philosophically. For instance 
when it comes to freedom of expression, it is a human right in a Western, Christian point 
of view. In Islam however it is a religious duty to stand up against tyrants or oppressors 
and defending the right of the people. Further, he is skeptical to democracy, emphasizing 
that he was not talking on behalf of the Muslim Brothers; “procedure wise I agree with 
democracy 100 %, theoretically I disagree”. What he disputed was the procedure of the 
resolve mechanism. What he finds difficult is the rule of the majority or alliances of 
certain social classes serving their own interests, leaving the minorities or lower social 
classes out of the decision making. Further, he argued that this mechanism resulted in 
growing political apathy in democracies as they became older, expressed by decreasing 
voter turnout. In contrast, the Shura is not supposed to look for the majority interest or 
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class interest, it is supposed to look for the interest of the whole society. (Al Houdaiby: 
interview 29.04.06.).  
Another aspect of the criticism of the Muslim Brothers’ relation to democracy is 
that they were protagonists for a one-party system; however this vision was not a 
rejection of democracy. The argument was twofold, first it was defended on the basis 
that Egypt needed to establish a common front against imperialism (Lia 1998: 10) 
second that it would represent “an “objective” ideological programme which 
transcended all personal and familial interests” (Lia 1998: 283). The Muslim Brothers 
have moved away from this idea ever since they reentered the political society. Further, 
they realize that they cannot reach the political platform on their own, both practically 
and ideologically: 
 “Political freedom is the best for the entire nation. The problem is the political 
transition will only take place if the opposition parties are sincere in bringing it 
about, and are focusing on what they have in common and are building common 
ground and are acting according to this common ground and are not willing to 
negotiate an agreement with the regime. When the opposition agrees on the 
principles, regardless of the outcome, when we agree that we want to have political 
freedom, when we agree that we are willing to agree with the people on this, this is 
very important even for the Muslim Brotherhood. If the people choose that it don’t 
want what we stand for, if we agree correctively to these conditions, we will be able 
to push and to challenge the government agenda, otherwise we wont be able to do 
so, the government will go to these parties and tell them if you really push for this 
the Muslim Brothers will come to power and the Muslim Brothers will introduce 
governance on Shari’ah. You can not claim to have democracy if you are limiting 
the outcome of the democracy.” (Al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
One last issue which the Muslim Brothers has yet to be clear about is the question of 
citizenship, especially regarding the Coptic45 minority in Egypt. Citizenship is 
understood as equality of rights of all citizens regardless of gender, religion, or race. The 
Muslim Brothers has been ambivalent on how their political platform will treat the Copts 
in terms of political rights. If Shari’ah is the source of jurisprudence, other religious 
groups become second grade citizen. However, the signals lately from the movement are 
turned towards granting all citizens universal human rights. 
Several position papers issued by the Muslim Brothers from the 1990s and 
onwards document the group’s prodemocratic turn, central are revamped views on 
                                                   
45 The Coptic Church is one of the earliest Christian Churches in the world, originally Egyptian.  
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women’s rights, parties and political pluralism, the role of Egyptian Copts, and the 
morality and utility of political violence (Al-Ghobashy 2005c). The vision of the 
political platform that the Muslim Brothers promotes is a political system close to 
democracy based on pluralism and political engagement. 
 “The priority is therefore to revitalize political life so that citizens can join a real 
debate about the solutions to Egypt’s chronic problems and the sort of future we 
want for our country. We believe that the domination of political life by a single 
political part or group, whether the ruling party, The Muslim Brotherhood or any 
other, is not desirable: the only result of such monopoly is the alienation of the 
majority of the people. Our aim in seeking to win a limited number of seats in 
parliament is to create an effective parliamentary bloc that, in conjunction with 
others, can energize an inclusive debate about the priorities of reform and 
development. Not a single political, religious, social or cultural group should be 
excluded from Egypt’s political life. The objective must be to end the monopoly of 
government by a single party and boost popular engagement in political activity.” 
(al-Shatir 2006). 
Political Program 
The Muslim Brothers has ever since the beginning, in addition to national issues, 
concerned itself with international and regional questions such as the Western 
hegemony, the Palestinian question, and the general challenge of the relationship 
between Islamic movements and regimes in the region (Mitchell 1968; Lia 1998; 
Rashwan 2006). This thesis is limited to concern issues of national policy, based on their 
political program developed prior to the parliamentary elections in 2005.  
TThe dual agenda, of programmatic goals and systemic change, is expressed 
together in the political program of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brothers has 
divided their political program between three pillars, which they call “visions” and that 
is describing, because the program is so comprehensive and mixes both visions of a 
better society as well as programmatic and issue based goals. The three pillars are 
Revival, Development and Reform. Since this thesis is most concerned with the efforts 
of the Muslim Brothers to make use of the political system in order to make political 
change this thesis will focus mainly on the political reform preceded by a brief review of 
the Revival and Development pillars. All through the program quotations from the 
Qur’an are used to emphasize the linkage between their political visions with the Islamic 
worldview.  
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Revival & Development 
One of the main political issues of the Muslim Brothers is to fight against corruption, 
which is a huge hindrance for democratization and economic development, and to 
combat political apathy because most Egyptians have lost faith in the political system. 
These issues are embraced by the more general notions of Development and Revival. 
In the political program of the Muslim Brothers the notion revival is understood in 
broad terms. It is not only a revival of Islamic values, but it includes a vision of freedom, 
human rights, rights of citizenship, moral values, culture, development of man, media, 
youth, women, and children.” (Ikhwanweb 09.05.06). The Muslim Brothers claims that 
revival and engagement is the key to change of the political system.  
The program illuminates four dimensions of Revival. First, dimension is freedoms, 
human rights and rights of citizenship. The Muslim Brothers argues that these freedoms 
and rights have been neglected in Egypt for a long time and the Egyptian people have 
lost their freedom and independency, but according to the Qur’an these are the rights of 
every people. Values, culture and development of man constitutes the second dimension 
of Revival. The Muslim Brothers argues that source of underdevelopment in Egypt 
stems form the “weakness of the culture of belonging and bad manners”. One of their 
main arguments is that the moral values have to be revived in order to bring about 
change and reform. The third dimension focuses on the role of women. The Muslim 
Brothers are considered to be modern in their views on women. For instance they were 
the only party that had a female representative running for the parliamentary election. 
The program states that women are equal to men, and that she is independent financially. 
However, according to the Qur’an women are different from men and hence she has her 
special rights as woman, of which some might seem limiting in a Western point of view. 
The last dimension is media. Beside education, media is the means that creates ideas, 
implants values, strengthens the bases of nation and determines the priorities of the 
society in a specific period. The last few years witnessed great development in the field 
of media, which led the media to have a great influence in forming the ideas and 
determining common values. Thus, the Muslim Brothers believe that the main message 
of the media is to urge the society, especially the youth, to adopt the values of liberty, 
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and sense of belonging to home, which are considered to be the base of a serious 
foundation, then to adopt the values of development, justice and good citizenship.  
The Muslim Brothers have a considerable focus on sustainable development. The 
program has a comprehensive list system focusing on their goals for development, the 
policies and the strategies needed to achieve development. National ownership over 
resources, self-development and technological development are central. The Muslim 
Brothers want to improve the industrial development in environmental friendly ways; to 
produce competitive goods for export, increase the self-sufficiency and decrease 
unemployment. In addition they have a thorough program for rural development, 
focusing on local management, developing more efficient methods for irrigation, 
reducing use of fertilizers and encouraging local and foreign investments. The program 
also considers something called constructional development referring to the 
improvement of infrastructures and buildings. Finally, they have a long list on education, 
scientific research and native development of technology, since this constitutes the first 
step in development and progress. 
The pillars on Revival and Development demonstrate the Muslim Brothers 
concern for socio-economic development. Yet, in order to bring about their political 
goals, change in regime, they need to focus on change of regime expressed in their 
visions for political reform.  
Reform 
The reform program has concrete proposals for immediate adoption of a series of 
policies and constitutional amendments. Their political reform program want to repeal 
the emergency law, lifting limitations on political and associational freedoms46, 
providing guarantees for the independence of the judiciary, activating the parliament’s 
role and provide for rotation of power in a democratic manner (Hamzawy & Brown 
December 2005). Further, the Muslim Brothers wants to change the system from 
presidential to parliamentary democracy, to decrease the power of the president and to 
enhance their own prospects to bring about change. The Brotherhood also demands the 
                                                   
46 Ongoing debate on the Political Parties Law (Al-Ahram. Ikhwanweb), discussed in chapter 4. 
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protection of public freedoms, including those of belief, opinion, and expression. 
(Hamzawy & Brown December 2005, al-Sayyed Habib 2006). 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s election platform is characterized by some notable 
internal tensions, some of which come in the context of its stress on its Islamic 
marja’iyya (source of reference point). The platform states that “the marja’iyya upon 
which we base our program for change is an Islamic one with democratic means in a 
modern civil state”. Elsewhere the movement calls for “a civil state founded to 
implement the Shar’iah and govern within the boundaries established by the Islamic 
religion.” The platform does not expand on this conception of an Islamic marja’iyya 
when it treats the issue of political reform, nor does it do so when it discusses the 
traditional issue stressed by the Brotherhood in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the 
application of the Islamic Shari’ah and the Islamization of public life. By its use of very 
broad but seemingly pragmatic terms, the Brotherhood provokes some genuine doubts. 
The question about how much its principle of an Islamic marja’iyya remains in tension 
with its acknowledgement of the civic nature of the state is crucial and cannot be left to 
unspecified statements.  
The Muslim Brothers realize that they cannot reform Egypt alone; they want to 
bring about reform based on cooperation with other parties and public debates.  
The priority is therefore to revitalize political life so that citizens can join a real 
debate about the solutions to Egypt’s chronic problems and the sort of future we 
want for our country (Al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). 
Hamzawy (2005c) argues that the reform initiatives of the Muslim Brothers are bridging 
the Islamist-secular divide and is a prerequisite for broad alliances for democracy. This 
will increase the second opportunity structure, cooperation with legal and illegal actors 
in order to reach their goals, political reform (fig. 4). 
 “The Muslim Brotherhood’s program for the parliamentary elections of 2005 is 
based on the reference that our method of change stems from. It is the Islamic 
reference and the democratic mechanisms of the modern civil state. As the Islamic 
method has the constituents of reform, it has the mechanisms of reforming humans 
in order to let the high moral values prevail; thus, each man wishes for others what 
he wishes for himself and faith increases. Consequently, man’s conscience comes to 
life and everyone feels Allah’s Presence; thus, the rates of corruption in society 
decrease on economic, political and social levels.”(IkhwanWeb) 
 58
The 2005 electoral program of the Brotherhood clearly expresses the priority of political 
reform (Hamzawy & Brown December 2005). This corresponds with the theory of 
Mainwaring (2003) that political parties in authoritarian regimes usually will choose to 
focus on political change or change of regime.  
Focusing on political reform provide great challenges for the parties concerned for 
two reasons. First, internally because issues of more immediate concern have to come in 
the shadow, as al-Ghobashy argues: 
“Many of the internal factional struggles in parties operating in authoritarian 
contexts revolve around which games to prioritize and how to balance the regime 
and electoral games. Seen in this light, parties are by definition dynamic 
organizations in perpetual transformation, and religious parties are no exception.” 
(al-Ghobashy 2005c: 376).  
Nevertheless, the political program is very clear on the priority on political reform. 
According to al-Houdaiby: 
“Right now we are focusing on the political platform, which is the space for 
political contestation that everybody agrees upon.  The platform is supposed to be 
neutral, fair, and inclusive. When we, Egypt, have this platform, we can compete 
with our political agendas. We are trying to set forth this platform and implement it 
and then we will have real democracy and we can compete having the rules of the 
game set” (Al houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
The second challenge is that the reforming parties become enemies of the regime, as 
mentioned earlier. That result in massive efforts to limit the reform activity, in Egypt the 
regime use in addition to widespread political restrictions, violent measures. “Despite 
continued containment and exclusion during the past few years, moderate Islamists have 
not questioned their strategic choice of gradual political reform.” (Hamzawy 2005c). 
This is the only way that they can prove that they are serious political actors, towards the 
regime, the constituents and internationally. 
We would like to let our people know that they are dearer to us than ourselves and 
that if someone is required to sacrifice their life, it is desirable for us to sacrifice 
ourselves for their honor, glory, dignity, religion and hopes. It is this emotion that 
controls our hearts led us to stand for elections. It is very hard for us to watch all 
these dangers surrounding our people, then surrender to humiliation and despair. 
We are working for the benefit of the people for the sake of the Almighty, more 
than we are doing for ourselves. We are working for you only, and we will never be 
against you one day. (Ikhwanweb) 
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Summary 
Several observers argue that there has been a marked tendency in the Brotherhood’s 
rhetoric towards political reform and democracy the last couple of years (Al-Ghobashy 
2005c, Hamzawy & Brown December 2005).  
“A crucial issue at stake is the fact that calling for democratic reform is becoming a 
central component of the Islamist agenda as well, if not its determining principle, 
one which transcends the others.” (Hamzawy 2005a).  
How do political obstacles and opportunities in the formal political system affect and 
shape the goals and strategies of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt? The Muslim Brothers 
are playing a dual game, electoral game to make changes in the regime as well regime 
game to make changes of the regime, prioritizing the latter. They want to bring about 
political freedom in order to bring about their political program for socio-economic 
development The Muslim Brothers has ever since the beginning focused on political 
reform; “evolution not revolution” (al-Banna: interview 03.05.06.). This means that the 
regime game played by the Muslim Brothers is based on peaceful change from within 
the system, even though they meet substantial resistance from the regime. The means to 
change the regime is in other words democratic, but what can we say about the ends, the 
political platform? 
The Muslim Brothers is faced with some challenges when it comes to the 
credibility of their vision of the political platform. The Ikhwan is not easy to categorize 
ideologically, however they resemble a religious social-democratic party, in how they 
focus on socio-economic development in their program and their efforts on democratic 
reforms. 
“I think the most important fact that people should realize is that MB is not a 
religious group, trying to impose a religious agenda on people. MB is a good and 
benevolent movement enjoying overwhelming popular support, the political 
program stems from the culture of the people, and appeals to the people. The 
program realizes the changes taking place in the world, being able to preserve the 
Islamic identity without closing or shutting down ourselves from the rest of the 
world. The focus is on interaction with the world, believing in the necessity of 
having a balanced dialog with other civilizations including the Western civilization, 
for the well-being of the humanity at large and for the Islamic civilization. 
Believing in human rights, and the necessity of having truly democratic societies, 
where human rights and civil rights, freedom of expression, freedom of choice 
exists” (Al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
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Thus, the Muslim Brothers still struggles in finding their ideological basis and what 
principles to guide their political reform and establishment of political platform. 
However, the Muslim Brothers are clearer in terms of the procedures; in how they bring 
about the change discussed in the next chapter. 
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4. Opportunity Structures in the Political Society 
How is the Muslim Brothers operating in the limited political society to bring about their 
political goals? This chapter will look at the capacities of the Muslim Brothers in 
utilizing the political opportunity structures open to them, and circumventing the 
obstacles; in the elections, in Parliament and in media. First, a short introduction of the 
context, the multiparty system, in the political society will be presented.  
Egypt’s Multiparty System 
The multiparty system is judicially consolidated by the Political Parties Law of 197747 
and currently Egypt has 20 active and legal political parties (Egypt State Information). 
However, the law excludes parties based on class, religion, or regional affiliation. “The 
practical result (and, most likely, the unstated intention) was to bar the two groups with 
the greatest capacity for popular mobilization – The Nasserist and the Muslim 
Brotherhood – from forming their own parties.” (Wickham 2002: 65). Further, to ensure 
state control, the Committee for the affairs of Political Parties, known as the Political 
Parties Committee (PPC), was established by Sadat, within the guidelines of the Political 
Parties Law, to regulate party activities as well as license new parties. The PPC remains 
unaltered under the Mubarak presidency (Kassem 2004; Majed 2005). The result is that 
the legal opposition parties with the exception of Neo-Wafd48 have been established on 
conditions made by the regime (ICG 2005). The Political reform of Sadat limited 
political participation to a small and rather artificial set of parties and restricted their 
right to political expression, which hindered the parliament to develop into a site of 
independent power. Kassem (2004) argues that because the multiparty arena was created 
from above, with stringent conditions preventing the emergence of popular and 
potentially challenging groupings, “Sadat’s objective was to ensure a transition from a 
weak single-party system to an equally weak multiparty system.” (Kassem 2004: 54). 
Majed (2005) states that the scope of the multiparty system has remained limited, “to the 
                                                   
47 Law 40 of 1977 
48 Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid. Nationalist liberal party. Established in post World War 1 to achieve the independce 
of Egypt. Dissolved in 1952 by the Free Officers Regime. Reestablished in 1983 as the New Wafd Party. 
Follows almost the same party-lines as the original party. Will be referred to as Wafd. 
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point where the system is closer to being a one-party state”. (Majed 2005: 12). Al-
Houdaiby expressed it this way: 
The opposition parties that are legal are only legal because they are weak. A couple 
of days ago a new conservative party was created, but no one knows about them or 
their agenda.  There will be no strong legal party, because of the control of PCC 
(Al-Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.). 
Shortly after assuming power, Mubarak declared that the multiparty system that he 
inherited from Sadat would be the cornerstone to build a democratic system of rule 
(Kassem 2004). However, the personal authoritarian rule continued under the 
government of Mubarak. “At Mubarak’s take over the political field was characterized 
by ideological, socioeconomic, and political disillusionment in Egypt, and this was a 
huge challenge to the personal rule as well as the newly constructed multiparty arena.” 
(Kassem 2004: 26). Mubarak projected the image of being an advocate of democracy in 
order to legitimize his position and consolidate his power (Kassem 2004). This is 
reflected in the name of the President’s political party, the National Democratic Party, 
and all official websites refer to the democratic system of Mubarak, which is constantly 
reforming towards more democracy. However, what Mubarak did was to institutionalize 
a dominant party system, “which consists of a large government party (NDP) in the 
centre and an array of small opposition parties on its left and right.” (Abdelrahman 2004: 
108). NDP has no ideological basis, “it is willing to accommodate any political or social 
force, including Islamic, that is willing to be absorbed by it” (Kodmani 2005), except 
from maintaining firm political control (Kodmani 2005; Majed 2005). NDP holds most 
seats in the legislature and dominates the media (Kodmani 2005; Majed 2005). In 2005 
the National Democratic Partly won 311 seats or 68.5 % in the Parliamentary election.  
In addition to the strict Political Parties Law and the PPC, controlling the forming 
and activities, the opposition parties have a weak popular and financial base, as well as 
membership is declining and many lack internal democracy (Lust-Okar 2005; Majed 
2005). Furthermore, in the second half of the 1990s the opposition political elite sought 
contact with the ruling elite in order to guarantee seats in Parliament, and this process 
caused lack of clarity about the roles of the opposition and government (Lust-Okar 2005; 
Majed 2005). Majed (2005) argues that the opposition parties also suffers from brain 
drain from the political society to the civil society because the prospects to set the 
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agenda are less controlled, at least for some issue based NGOs. Political parties suffer 
from a lot of internal disputes, as they also play dual games; to please the regime or stick 
to their ideology (Kassem 2004). According to the ICG report “the legal opposition 
parties can rather be denoted as technocratic formations without inner dynamics or 
appeal to humans with political commitment” (ICG 2005). ICG, also reminds us that the 
opposition parties cannot be regarded as political parties in a Western sense, when 
dealing with the multiparty system in Egypt (ICG 2005). These factors have led to 
political apathy among Egyptians.  
By restricting participatory rights, with the Political Parties Law and the PPC, 
Wickham argues that “the regime created a new category of political actors, those 
groups and movements whose existence was tolerated but were denied formal legal 
status.” (Wickham 2002: 65). First and foremost she refers to the Muslim Brothers, 
however the last couple of years the protest movement Kifaya49 and the judges 
constitutes a real opposition to the regime. Kifaya is a grassroots movement composed 
of leftist activists, earning support from some Islamists, liberals and nationalists, and its 
main activity is organizing protests and creating engagement against the existing regime. 
It does not have a political program; however in 2005 they established a manifesto that 
lists seven goals divided in two sections, the first section focuses on countering Western/ 
US presence in the Middle East and the Zionists in Israel. Second is to change the 
regime towards substantial democracy. They are criticized for not being a serious actor 
and that they focus their critics almost solely on President Mubarak (ICG 2005, 
Hamzawy October 2005). The judges on the other hand is making claims for more 
political freedom from the regime, however they are internally divided between regime 
friendly and opponents (Hamzawy October 2005). These groups are among the excluded 
groups in Lust-Okar’s model and they are not attempting to get influence through the 
electoral channel as the Muslim Brotherhood does.  
What does illegal mean? It is a real political dilemma; the regime gives legal status 
to unpopular parties and popular parties are illegal. Why? This is a strategy from 
the regime, not to have opponent parties that constitute a real threat. In any society 
combined together, are the people and the law. In democratic societies the law is 
protecting the people; in Egypt the law is protecting the regime. Some parties have 
their legitimacy from the law others from the people. I am not only talking about 
                                                   
49 Kifaya means Enough! They are also called Egyptian Movement for Change.  
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the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Wasat, Al-Karama, Kifaya, all these movements and 
parties are illegitimate but they are popular (Al Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
The Egyptian multiparty system is characterized as controlled pluralism in the sense that 
political reform is decided from above and executive authority dominates all political 
life, which again preserves the authoritarian regime by enhancing its capacity to contain 
and moderate dissent (Wickham 2002, Kassem 2004, Majed 2005). Wickham (2002) 
argues that the formal multiparty system together with the state of emergency, has 
limited the formation of party cadres in two ways; by hampering outreach by legal 
opposition parties and by altering the cost-benefit calculations of potential recruits. 
Further the Parliament is merely a rubber stamp institution, because the power is in the 
hands of the president and NDP. Members of various political parties in Parliament have 
the last couple of decades drafted bills, submitted questions and interpellations, and 
raised issues for debate. Yet, the control of the opposition parties, the dominant position 
of NDP in parliament and the executive power over the legislative branch, has made the 
role of the opposition limited to that of “parties of opinion” with no real influence over 
state policy (Wickham 2002, Kassem 2004, Majed 2005). This situation has resulted in 
that Egypt’s opposition parties have failed to develop into effective vehicles of interest 
aggregations and representation, and then again raised political apathy and lack of 
interest in politics on popular basis.  
Parliamentary Elections 
In the Mubarak era there have been three different electoral systems which have altered 
the opportunity structures for the Muslim Brothers. First, in 1984 it was the List 
Proportional Representation (PR) system – a party centered proportional representation 
system. Second, a Parallel System with party lists and 48 single-member districts was 
the system in 1987 and third, the candidate-centered Two-Round system (the 1990, 
1995, 2000 and 2005 (three-round) elections), still in effect to day. Each system has had 
an impact on the country’s entire process of political interaction, the effectiveness of the 
legislature, the supervisory role of the People’s Assembly, and the relations between 
different parties and political forces (Majed 2005).  
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Electoral Laws & Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Strategies 
The 1983 Election Law50 decided that the 1984 parliamentary election, the first real 
parliamentary election, was a party-list or “proportional representation” system (Kassem 
2004, Al-Ghobashy 2005c, Majed 2005). Further, if a party gained less than eight 
percent of the nationwide it could not be represented in the People’s Assembly and the 
votes went automatically to the largest party, the NDP (Kassem 2004, Al-Ghobashy 
2005c). Hence, in the 1984 elections the Political Parties Law and the Election Law put 
strict restrictions on party formation, eliminated independent candidates, and strict 
barriers were set for parliamentary access. The electoral rules excluded not only 
independent candidates, but also all the legalized opposition parties apart from Neo-
Wafd, which formed an electoral alliance with the Muslim Brothers to gain a combined 
total of fifty-eight parliamentary seats or 15.1 %. Why did the Muslim Brothers 
negotiate an alliance with the liberal, secular Wafd? First, the Wafd provided a legal 
channel while the Ikhwan offered a popular base. They were both eager to enter the 
political scene after long state-enforced absence. Second, only the Wafd-Ikhwan alliance 
overcame the threshold of 8 percent (Al-Ghobashy 2005c, Kandil: interview 06.04.06, 
Al-Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.).  
After pressure from the political opposition the 1983 Electoral Law, the party-list 
system, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) for 
discriminating against independents. The government passed a new Electoral Law51 
which maintained the 8 % threshold and the party list system, but cancelled the 
automatic transferring of votes to the majority party and reserved forty-eight of 
Parliament’s 448 seats for independent candidates (Kassem 2004, Al-Ghobashy 2005, 
Majed 2005). The president decided at the end of 1986 to approve the amendment of the 
existing electoral law, dissolved the People’s Assembly, and sat a premature election 
date in spring 1987 (Kassem 2004, Al-Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.). The Muslim 
Brothers created an electoral alliance, the “Islamic Alliance” with the Labor Party, Hizb 
al-A’mal, and the Liberal Party, Hizb al-Ahrar (Al-Ghobashy 2005, Al-Houdaiby: 
interview 10.04.06.). In the 1984 alliance with the Wafd, the Brothers had limited 
                                                   
50 Law 114 of 1983 
51 Law 188 of 1986 
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political influence and possessed a junior-partner role together with the established and 
ideologically coherent Wafd. The Brothers soon took the leading role in the “Islamic 
Alliance” as the other parties were weaker and ideologically flexible, and together they 
adopted the political slogan “Islam is the Solution” (al-Islam huwa al-hall). The Al-
Ahrar virtually became the Muslim Brothers, which the regime did not approve of and in 
the mid 1990s the regime froze the party (Kandil: interview 06.04.06). The alliance won 
17 % of the national vote, translated into fifty-six seats, thirty-six went to the Muslim 
Brothers (Al-Ghobashy 2005, Al-Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.).  
The opposition returned to the SCC questioning the constitutionality of the 1986 
Election Law based on the same arguments presented against the 1983 Election Law. 
The SCC declared the Electoral Law unconstitutional and the ruling pressured President 
Mubarak to issue a decree abolishing the party-list system. In 1990 Law 201 was issued, 
based on a candidate-centered system, giving all qualified people the right to declare 
their candidates without any constraints. (Majed 2005; Kandil: interview 06.04.06).  
Kassem (2004) argues that the President’s decision to abolish the party-list system was a 
political tactical choice; first by abiding by the court decision the President was 
highlighting his respect for the rule of law, an aspect he has persistently attempted to 
utilize as a legitimization platform for his rule. Second, the party-list law united the 
opposition, as reflected in electoral alliances, as well as the court challenges and 
condemnation of the government-imposed rules; all indicate that “Mubarak realized that 
the party-list system was not as conducive to containing political opponents as originally 
intended” (Kassem 2004: 61). Another aspect of the independent candidacy system is 
that it made it more difficult to secure representation for political parties and in 
particular the weaker ones (Majed 2005), discouraging the opposition parties in general 
to compete for power (Kassem 2004). Further, Al-Houdaiby (interview 29.04.06) argues 
that voting for individual candidates in elections are easier manipulated or the votes are 
“pushed down” which means “excluding the votes from someone and including other 
votes for the NDP. Welcome to Egypt!” (El Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.). In addition, 
the legal opposition parties complained about structural and procedural elements that 
further hindered free and fair elections. On the one side the opposition continued to 
object to the prevalence of emergency law and its hindrance on political participation. 
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On the other side, they opposed the Ministry of Interior’s tradition of supervising polling 
stations and the ballot count and called for full judiciary supervision of elections. This 
overall discontent with the election law and the election process made the opposition 
parties decide to boycott the 1990 legislative elections, except from the Tagammu’ 
Party. 
 The 1995 election is characterized by the opposition’s poor electoral gains in 
comparison to their achievements during the 1980s. While Tagammu’ managed to 
maintain five seats, Wafd gained only six. The Nasserists, the Liberals, and the Muslim 
Brothers all gained one seat each. The Labor party did not obtain any seats. The 
elections during the 1990s reflect the political polarization between the secular parties, 
supporting the NDP and the Islamist opposition parties. Indicative of this was the fact 
that throughout its electoral campaign Tagammu’ adopted the campaign slogan “al-din 
lillah wa al-watan lil jami’” (“religion is for God and the nation is for all”). Neo-Wafd 
adopted similar tactics; its campaign posters depicted an imam and priest in their 
respective religious garbs alongside a peasant at work under the slogan “al-Wafd al-
jaded: hizb al-wahda al-wataniya” (“the Neo-Wafd: the party for national unity”). Not 
all of the opposition parties were supporting the regime’s anti-Islamist campaign. The 
Labor party maintained its Islamic overtones and cooperation with the Muslim Brothers, 
even Muslim Brotherhood’s slogan “Islam is the Solution” was used by Labor party 
members. On a less involved level, the Nasserist Party questioned the logic of excluding 
the Muslim Brothers from legitimate political participation. While opposition parties 
such as Tagammu’ and Neo-Wafd incurred electoral losses in the 1995 elections due to 
the adoption of platforms similar to that of the government, the lack of electoral success 
for Labor and the Nasserists is linked to their encouragement of Islamist views. The 
polarization of the opposition parties across religious lines placed the secular parties, 
both right wing and leftists on the same side and made them ideologically weaker 
(Hinnebusch 1990; Abdelrahman 2004). 
In the 1995 election Muslim Brotherhood decided to have members runing as 
independents, as they also did in 2000 and 2005. The regime has reversed its earlier 
tolerance after the Brothers chose to run as independents (Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 
1999). The elections with independent system have been characterized with more 
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violence and imprisonment of candidates, as the regime’s desperate effort to control the 
opposition. Mubarak’s approach to the nonviolent Islamist opposition during the 1980s 
stood midway between accommodation and exclusion. The Muslim Brotherhood 
maintained its own national and regional offices; issued public statements; and published 
its own journal, but it was barred from forming its own party. Although it technically 
remained an illegal organization, the Brotherhood was allowed to participate in the 1984 
and 1987 elections in alliance with the Wafd and Labor Parties (Wickham 2002). In both 
elections with party-list system, alliances with the Muslim Brothers received more votes 
than all the other opposition parties combined, indicating their capacity to mobilize 
(Wickham 2002) as well as making strategic choices to enter Parliament. In addition the 
Muslim Brothers has been the only opposition movement in Egypt capable of mobilizing 
substantial support for an ideological program distinct from that of the Mubarak regime 
(Wickham 2002).  
Electoral Surveillance 
Prior to the 2000 election, a historical ruling by SCC provided hope of a potentially 
advantageous electoral procedure for the opposition. (Kassem 2004; El Houdaiby: 
interview 10.04.06.). The SCC declared that according to constitution complete judicial 
supervision of legislative elections is necessary. “The implementation of full judiciary 
supervision in the 2000 legislative elections brought revived hope for both contestants 
and voters in regards to Egypt’s ailing twenty-year democratic experiment.” (Kassem 
2004: 74).  
During the 1990s an ongoing legal conflict between the opposition and the 
government had been going on. The government defended its position on practical 
arguments such as the lack of judges for overseeing all the ballot boxes. For years the 
constitution was interpreted in various ways e.g. having a judge in each district, not each 
polling box or polling station, or the judges were responsible for counting the polling 
boxes, without any control of procedural matters (Kassem 2004; El Houdaiby: interview 
10.04.06, Brown & Nasr 2005). The SCC justified its ruling by noting that the judiciary 
is an impartial entity and that judicial supervision must be substantive not merely formal 
(Kassem 2004). Kassem (2004) states that the verdict and the equally powerful 
comments of the SCC left the government with little room for maneuver. Further, 
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ignoring the verdict of the nations’ highest court would have undermined the President’s 
respect for the rule of law, which has been the main legitimization tool for the 
president’s authority. (Kassem 2004). 
Contrary to producing more free and fair elections the new electoral rules for 
judiciary surveillance produced new forms of constraining tactics. First, the Ministry of 
Interior maintained its control over registered voter lists which meant that certain 
obstructions and disruptions continued. (Kassem 2004; al-Houdaiby: interview 
10.04.06). 
There are many examples on how the regime is forging the election results and it is 
a whole process of manipulation from campaigning to the actual election. It is for 
instance been observed that non-existing people are registered as NDP voters. My 
grandfather was the general guide of the Brotherhood and he votes for the NDP (!), 
according the voter list. (Al-Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06). 
Secondly, after 2000, elections are marked by more violence because the government 
has less control over the electoral process in the new electoral framework (Kassem 2004; 
El Houdaiby: interview 10.04.06.). Because the government could no longer control the 
activities inside the polling stations, they had to control them from outside and 
preventing some of the voters from entering the stations (Al-Houdaiby: interview 
10.04.06.). The security forces apply various violent and manipulative methods in order 
to bar voters form casting their ballots, both in urban and rural areas. Here I will give 
one example on how voters are physically hindered to vote, also referred to in Kassem’s 
book (2004).  
I have a video tape from the Election Day 2000. In the Doqqi constituency of Cairo, 
my grandfather, Ma’moon al-Houdaiby, a senior member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its official spokesman was competing against Amal Osman, a 
former long serving minister and senior member of the NDP. The security forces 
was lined up with rifles and tear gas canisters in front of the polling station and they 
made sure that nobody was allowed inside, until a bus filled with NDP supporters 
came and they let them into the polling stations My grandfather and other Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters were not allowed to enter the polling station by the security 
forces. They took his camera and broke his hand. (El Houdaiby: interview 
10.04.06).  
According to Kassem (2004) the Doqqi case was a sensitive issue for the government, 
“it would be highly embarrassing if the Doqqi voters were to give preference to a senior 
Brotherhood leader over a competitor of equal seniority in the ruling party given that Al-
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Houdaiby was a popular candidate. Al-Houdaiby’s popularity may not have been simply 
a consequence of the political support he derived from the Muslim Brotherhood, but also 
a consequence of his Doqqi family origins and hence presumably his status as a “local 
son” (ibn al-hay).” (Kassem 2004: 69).  
A third feature of the elections post 2000, is more intensive use of clientelism, 
vote-buying and threats. Al-Houdaiby said that some government officials go to 
different stores and factories and threat the owners and the staff, saying that if they do 
not vote for the NDP, they will close their place. This is not only a personal business; it 
will harm the whole business and the family. As well as more interruption of political 
campaigns, with imprisonment.  (Al-Houdaiby: 29.04.06.). 
“Never undermine the Egyptian people; a well-known phenomenon in the last 
election was that people took money from the NDP candidate and vote for a MB 
candidate. The NDP gave 50 EL to make people vote for them, but many people 
took the money and voted for MB instead and this happens a lot. This example 
shows that people are not so easy to buy, we got a phone call at the HQ from a bus 
driver and he told us that he got an envelope with 50 EL to vote for Mustafa Selab 
(the NDP candidate), and he said; we took the money and voted for you! He just 
called to deliver the message and then he hung up” (Al-Houdaiby: 29.04.06.).  
The Muslim Brothers have got more legal/ structural opportunities to participate in 
elections with the electoral candidate-system and the judicial supervision of polling 
stations; however the regime has intensified its control and use of force to limit the 
scope of the Muslim Brothers activities. Nevertheless, the Brothers are determined to not 
give in and continue their insistent work within the political society.  
The 2005 Reform & Election 
The political reforms in 2005 lifted some of the strict limitations on freedom of 
association and expression. Further, judicial surveillance of the elections gave hope for a 
more free and fair election. The election campaigns saw freer discussion and media 
coverage, freedom to expression had undoubdetly expanded since the last elections. 
However, the regime showed far less tolerance for freedom of association. Further, 
Egypt witnessed limited but real willingness to accept some domestic monitoring, 
discrete arrangements for international observers, and the creation of at least the form of 
an independent election commission (Hamzawy & Brown December 2005).  
 72
These developments combined created a sense of opportunity among Egypt’s 
diverse opposition groups. None of Egypt’s political actors expected that parliamentary 
elections would result in anything other than a victory for the NDP, but the extent of that 
victory, the nature and size of the parliamentary opposition, and the ability of the regime 
to prevent meaningful reform were all open to question. Some new political actors, most 
notably the Kifaya movement, sprang forward. Kifaya is not a political party with any 
real political program; however they are challenging the regime, especially in terms of 
pushing the limits on freedom of expression.  
The sense that change was possible created strong incentives for opposition groups 
to join forces in the United National Front for Change and Reform (UNFCR) to confront 
the regime. Since the rebirth of a multiparty system in Egypt in the 1970s, opposition 
parties has periodically discussed a united front but attempts generally collapsed because 
of deep ideological and personal divisions. Not only were legal opposition parties 
included but also the Kifaya movement and respected nonpartisan public figures. The 
formation of the UNFCR united most major opposition movements around a detailed 
program of political reform and an agreement to coordinate in the parliamentary 
elections. The Muslim Brothers cooperated with this front, but chose to run 
independently (Hamzawy & Brown December 2005). But by displaying respect for its 
pluralism even as it contained secular forces, the Brotherhood managed to situate itself 
in the heart of the movement for political reform. Indeed, it defended the rights of its 
secularist reform allies. 
As mentioned in the introduction NDP won its expected victory, obtaining a total 
of 311 out of the 444 seats in parliament, guaranteeing a comfortable majority on 70 
percent. The Muslim Brothers secured 20 percent of the seats, other opposition parties 
won 3.5 percent of the seats, and independents won 6.5 percent of the seats. Abaza 
(2006) argues that the regime improved the margin of freedom to the Muslim Brothers 
prior to the elections, releasing Muslim Brothers’ activists from jail and allowing 
movement leaders access to the state media. Though, when it became clear that the MB 
was by far Egypt’s largest opposition group, the regime reversed its policy of tolerance 
and resumed its intimidation of the MB during the second and third rounds of balloting. 
Having the MB as the largest political opposition in parliament offers a pretext to voices 
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within the regime who justify authoritarianism on the grounds that the alternative is total 
control by Islamists. Yet the low turn-out – around 25 percent – proves that neither the 
ruling party nor the MB reflects the will of the Egyptian people (Abaza 2006). The 
Muslim Brothers obtained 88 seats in Parliament, and was by far the strongest 
opposition party. “Other opposition groups performed very badly. Indeed, the 
Brotherhood’s calculations regarding the opposition coalition weakness proved 
extremely accurate. The National Front for Change and Reform was unable to mount 
effective campaigns in most districts and won only twelve seats.” (Hamzawy & Brown 
December 2005). 
The Muslim Brothers submitted only 150 candidates for election, officially 
independents, even though they could have submitted more, because they did not want 
to frighten the regime, and appear as a real threat to the regime (Ibrahim: interview 
05.04.06, al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  Besides it is a general opinion that if the 
elections were not forged, more than 88 Muslim Brotherhood members would have won 
a seat in the parliament. Even the Egyptian Prime Minister said on an interview on BBC 
after the 2005 elections that “If it were not for the security interference in elections, MB 
candidates would win extra 40 seats” (Ahmad 2006, al-Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06., 
al-Banna: interview 03.05.06.). The Muslim Brothers might have strategic reasons for 
running a certain number of candidates, and the regime, might have open up to a certain 
degree in order to show the West, the Islamic threat to the regime. 
What characterize the political reform of President Mubarak in 2005 is the multi-
candidate election and that the parliamentary elections were “significantly fairer and 
more transparent than in the past, although marred by violence” (Michele Dunne 2006). 
The political reforms in Egypt were a result of external pressure and the legislative 
amendments prior to the election did not represent any substantial change of the system 
(Hamzawy February 2005, ICG 2005). The legislative amendments are described as 
”cosmetic” and have only taken the attention away from the need of extensive changes, 
and are in no way sufficient so that the opposition can challenge the power monopoly of 
NDP. The parliamentary election was considered a possibility for the regime to show its 
seriousness about political reforms. However, as I will return to, even though the 
opposition does get a certain degree of influence in parliament, the main problem is the 
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parliament’s lack of power. Until now, the legislative assembly has merely functioned as 
a rubber stamp organ for decisions taken by the executive power. Even though Egypt 
denotes it self a democracy, it is evident that democratic institutions is not sufficient. 
Egypt is under immense pressure from national liberal opposition groups, Muslim 
organizations and from external actors to put an end to the 50 years old authoritarian 
regime and to introduce substantial democracy. The regime defends its reluctance to 
carry out substantial political reforms, arguing that political openings will result in 
political instability (Abaza 2006). Abaza (2006) and others argues that the only reason 
that Mubarak carried out political reforms in 2005, was to show that the only serious 
political opposition is the Islamists, and that the regime will gain support internationally 
and from many internal actors to maintain the status quo. 
After the parliamentary elections in 2005, the Egyptian political system has 
emerged as sharply bipolar. On the one hand stands a semiauthoritarian regime, centered 
on the institution of the presidency. The regime shows some cracks and divisions as well 
as initial signs of a succession crisis, but it still has an overwhelming ability to dominate 
and structure public life. On the other hand stands the Muslim Brotherhood. As 
mentioned above other political actors – most notably a host of political parties and 
movements that form the secular opposition – performed quite poorly in the elections. 
(Hamzawy & Brown December 2005).  
The Political Opportunities in Parliament 
Participating in elections is only interesting if it has any political influence in 
Parliament. After a short introduction of the Muslim Brothers status in Parliament, this 
chapter will discuss how the Muslim Brothers cooperate with other parties and their 
performance in parliament. I have not information about all electoral periods, so this 
chapter will focus on the last two election periods. 
Muslim Brothers in Parliament 
The Muslim Brotherhood has chosen to invest in the formal political system in hope of 
reforming the political system from within. So how is the status of the Brothers in 
Parliament? 
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Because the candidates in Parliament are voted as individuals they are not denoted 
as parties, but blocks. The Muslim Brothers in Parliament are recognized as the Muslim 
Brotherhood Block or the Islamic Block, other times they call them the religious trend or 
the Group of 88 (independents). (Al Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). Some candidates 
are independent and they are called by their name, but most belongs to a party block and 
this shows the paradox of the multiparty system; that the Muslim Brothers are in the 
Parliament even though they legally are prevented from forming a party.  
In official documents their names are registered as independents, but if you see the 
slogans of the different candidates they have been elected as “the candidates of the 
Muslim Brotherhood” on poster, flyers, banners and so fort. We made this a point 
that all our parliamentarians were elected on the basis that they were members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. When the regime says that MB is an outlaw organization, 
MB refuses and says that they have been elected in Parliament as member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The regime says that the parliamentarians are elected as 
independents, however the parliamentarians says no, we were elected by people 
knowing that we are not only members, but candidates of the MB. (El Houdaiby: 
interview 29.04.06.). 
Even though the Muslim Brothers is the biggest opposition block in Parliament, the 
NDP are trying to control their performance. Al-Houdaiby said that “in many cases the 
Speaker of the People’s Assembly refuses to give the speech (floor) to a Muslim 
Brotherhood member and sometimes this leads to verbal or physical fighting. The 
Muslim Brothers are represented in all 19 committees of the parliament.  
Nevertheless, the Muslim Brothers have increased their confidence in Parliament 
and have become more offensive. In November 2006 the Muslim Brotherhood decided, 
for the first time, to field candidates for the posts of parliamentary speaker and deputy 
speakers. The Muslim Brothers candidates did a good election, nevertheless the NDP 
veteran Fathi Surour, won the post of speaker. It is not clear whether Brotherhood MPs 
will also run for the chairmanship of the assembly’s 19 committees. Since emerging as a 
major force in parliament the Brotherhood has been keen to play down any conflicts 
with the NDP over key parliamentary posts and has refrained from fielding its own 
candidates. That the tactic has now been scrapped is a reflection of the worsening 
relationship between the government and the largest opposition group in parliament. The 
strong position of the Muslim Brothers in Parliament has intensified the tension between 
the government and the Islamic movement. This tension is also been taking place on 
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other levels as well such as random imprisonment of Ikhwan members, limiting their 
activities prevent the group’s candidates standing in labor and university union elections. 
In response the Brotherhood is aiming to make parliament the arena for the ongoing 
battle. Referring to a Brotherhood press conference, Al-Ahram, notes that the main 
reason for the new “confrontational stand” is to send several messages to the NDP. First, 
it should abandon its tactic of ostracizing the opposition and accept that it must share 
power and positions in parliament. The 2005 elections, he argued, significantly altered 
the status quo: with opposition and independent MPs now occupying 25 per cent of seats 
in parliament, it is no longer viable for the NDP to continue its monopoly of key 
assembly posts (Al Ahram 9 - 15 November 2006 Issue No. 819).  
Cooperation with Other Parties in Parliament 
Other opposition parties in Parliament constitute less than 10 percent. This makes it less 
important for the Brothers to cooperate with other parties. In Parliament their dual goals 
complicates their relation to other parties. On the one hand they want broad support to 
bring about political change, which many are willing to. On the other hand most of the 
opposition parties, which are secular, disagree with their programmatic goals. 
  One of the most important issues that the Muslim Brothers focuses on for reform 
is to remove the Emergency Law. On this issue a broad specter of parliamentarians have 
joined forces: 
“An alliance called Parliamentarians against Emergency Law was established a 
couple of weeks ago and the Muslim Brotherhood is in this alliance. It is 
collecting signatures of parliament members opposing the extension of the 
Emergency law. So far the opposition parties, independents and different 
government members have signed and three NDP members have signed and 
they are also making a list of people who agree on extending the law three 
years. They are planning to go to the districts and tell the people there, that 
members of the Parliament, their representatives, are responsible for the 
extension of the Emergency law for another three years, to suppress your 
freedoms and limit your freedoms. I think this is a very good way of 
working with other parliamentarians. The Minister of Justice will get 
troubles, we have the things right now, the focus right now is empowering 
the society and this is what we want” (Al Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
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 “We cooperate for election, but we put our members on our individual lists, but 
cooperate with them. In parliament we cooperate with many of them” (Al Erian: 
interview 02.05.06) 
Muslim Brotherhood Performance in Parliament 
Since 2000 the People’s Assembly has witnessed a strong participation on the part of 
Muslim Brotherhood representatives (Raswan 2006). During the first months in 
Parliament (2006) MB MPs succeeded to block a trade agreement with Denmark, “the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s MPs lobbied the parliament Committee of Economics not to 
endorse an agreement with the Danish government as consequence to its inadequate 
reaction to the offensive cartoons published by a Danish newspaper depicting Prophet 
Muhammed.” (Ikhwanweb: 01.02.06). The NDP candidate, Mustafa el-Salab and deputy 
chief of the Economic Committee, even supported the MB and their arguments. (ibid). 
Since the election in 2005, the Muslim Brothers keeps regularly summaries of 
their own performance in Parliament, published on Ikhwanweb, their official website. In 
general they showed a high attendance rate in parliamentary sessions throughout 2006. 
First, their legislative performance are scrutinized, the Bloc’s members represented 38 
draft laws and proposals; many of which are related to their reform program; e.g. on the 
judicial authority, penalty laws, political parties and freedom of press. Second, is the 
Muslim Brothers monitoring of the government’s performance. The Brothers has 
presented more than 3000 enquiries and questions and less than half of them were 
answered orally. Further, they also presented 28 requests for hearing, only seven of these 
were discussed in parliament, and they were of a more issue-based character and not 
related to reform. 
The Muslim Brothers Bloc have offered a memorandum to show the vision of the 
bloc about the constitutional amendment that included 13 cancellation and 23 
amendments in the legislative authority and its relations to other authorities particularly 
the executive authority by virtue of the parliamentary system that based on executive 
authority's dualism, in order not that the President of the state will have separate 
specifications and decisions without the approval of the ministers and the concerned 
ministers, who are wholly subject to be questioned by the parliament. The amendments 
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included the independence of the judicial authority through a united judiciary system 
that has the jurisdiction's right and completely prevent the interference of the executive 
authority in the issues of the judicial authority; also the amendments included the 
relation between the President and other authorities. In addition they have an 
international agenda, participating in parliamentary delegations and in other 
international interactions. They have been in meetings with representatives from 
Western embassies and delegations to Egypt.  
It has been observed that in order to reduce some of the political issues of the 
Muslim Brothers, NDP copies them in order to appear as reform friendly. Al-Houdaiby 
expressed:  
Take them, implement them! We hope they do, we do not care who brings about 
reform, we care if it is a real reform. The government is not willing to reform, it is 
not because they lack ideas, they are not reforming because they are corrupt. Many 
political parties have ideas of freedom and human rights. This is what we do in 
Parliament, we represent our ideas, please take them, we do not care if I represented 
them or you represented them or the devil represented them! (Al-Houdaiby: 
interview 29.04.06.). 
Further he said that most of the time the government does not listen to the critics, 
most of the critique from the Brothers are on corruption, however, sometimes they listen 
in fear of public opinion (Al Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.).  
Nationally, in the recent parliament, the movement’s small bloc, which began with 
seventeen seats in 2000 and declined to fifteen when the government successfully 
overturned the election of two deputies, did put forward a series of parliamentary 
questions and interpellations of ministers that focused on the compatibility of some laws 
with the Islamic Shari’ah as well as a set of moral and cultural issues. But the 
Brotherhood deputies also expressed concern about economic and social issues, 
especially corruption and unemployment. In the final two years, they joined the trend to 
give priority to political reform and to confront the NDP’s legislative agenda in the field 
of political rights, political parties, and amendment of Article 76 of the constitution 
(governing presidential elections) when the ruling party’s initiative lacked a democratic 
basis. 
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Access to Media 
Access to media is the last aspect of the political opportunity structures. This is not 
directly related to the political society, but this chapter will focus on how the Muslim 
Brothers use media to express their political goals and to appear as a serious political 
actor. In the Muslim Brotherhood assessment of the parliamentary performance, referred 
to in the previous chapter, one chapter is dedicated to an analysis on their media 
strategy, illuminating the importance of this aspect for the Muslim Brothers.  
State Control of Media 
A number of laws restrict media and the freedom of expression. In addition, there are 
indirectly structural conditions that further complicate political parties to recruit support. 
This chapter will look at the juridical and structural hindrances for political expression, 
followed by a discussion on the changes of the media during the last election. 
 The Egyptian media is restricted by at least three factors; first, media is totally co-
opted by the regime, the Egyptian constitution put strict restrictions on freedom of 
expression and finally the Emergency Law gives the regime the opportunity to interfere 
when it finds it necessary. First, opposition parties’ outreach to the Egyptian public 
occurs under the watchful eye of the authoritarian state. The Law on the Union of Radio 
and Television put media under complete government control, so that opposition parties 
can not use them to publicize their programs and positions to the general public, while 
the ruling party enjoys wide-ranging opportunities to do so. The ownership and activity 
of state-owned papers, or so-called ‘national’ papers, is controlled by the Shura Council, 
which functions according to government directives and appoints the chairmen and 
editors-in-chief of these newspapers. Again, opposition parties can not use them to put 
forward their political positions or explain their positions to the public at a time of 
important political developments. The same applies to mass cultural activities and to 
media centers in the various governorates; with the government and the ruling party 
monopolizing the mass media, the average citizen do not enjoy the right to obtain 
information and statements from different sources which would allow him or her to 
judge events and take the appropriate positions from a choice of alternatives. Citizens 
learned of different alternatives by way of the government’s position on them in the 
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mass media, which usually distorted these alternatives (Shukor 2005: 48).  Emergency 
laws augment the state’s authority to monitor, arrest, and detain those suspected of 
activities deemed threatening to national security. They also restrict the exercise of the 
freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution in ways that 
hinder party efforts to recruit support.” (Wickham 2002: 71). 
In addition, the opposition media face a number of structural limitations. First, 
they confronted supply-side constraints, such as the lesser quality of the newsprint 
available to them and their reliance on advertising revenues (rather than state subsidies) 
to cover printing costs. In addition, there were pressures to engage in self-censoring and 
instances of harassment and detainment of newspaper staff by state security agents. 
Although the opposition parties were allowed to express their views in print, various 
laws restricted their access to “the street”. “The Ministry of Interior also prohibited the 
distribution of opposition literature in public places, thus limiting citizens’ familiarity 
with them (Wickham 2002: 72). 
Increasing calls for media independence are evident in Egypt; such calls were 
particularly strong regarding media coverage of the 2005 elections (Al-Fegiery 2006). 
Media conduct during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005 showed some 
positive developments in contrast to previous elections, in which the media were 
completely partial. In particular, new independent Egyptian newspapers distinguished 
themselves by professional, objective coverage of opposition candidates and platforms 
“and greater criticism of the government than has been seen in half a century.” Egypt 
suffers from the lack of a legal framework regulating media’s role during elections. In 
the case of the Egyptian parliamentary elections, the electoral law is silent on the role of 
media coverage, in which case the matter is outside the authority of the electoral 
commission and therefore left to the Ministry of Information. Egypt, like other countries 
in the region, lack regulations for paid advertising, with no supervision of advertising 
expenditures and no unified price structure for campaign advertisement (Fegiery 2006).  
Government media in Egypt, gave all candidates free air time to present their 
electoral programs, an unprecedented and positive development, however, the larger 
picture favored government candidates and candidates from illegal parties were 
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excluded, i.e. the Muslim Brothers. First, outside the framework of this free time most 
public media outlets showed unconcealed partiality toward government candidates on 
news broadcasts and talk shows. Second, despite the quantitative balance in presentation 
of the candidates on public television, at the qualitative level coverage was characterized 
by monotony and repetition as well as deliberative avoidance of controversial issues. 
Third, for the most part electoral committees either had no way to stop media-related 
violations during elections campaigns or did so inconsistently. “Subordination of media 
to politicians more than to professional standards was a problem observed in Egypt. 
Government officials are accustomed to treating media as institutions for political 
propaganda and readily use them to defame electoral opponents; such as Ghad Party 
leader Ayman Nour, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Most media outlets, especially 
television channels, lacked objectivity in their take on events. Furthermore, opportunities 
for media coverage of independent candidates were nearly nonexistent (Al-Fegiery 
2006). “Among the useful lessons from the parliamentary elections in Egypt is that 
political movements cannot rely on media to build constituencies. Despite the fact that 
secular movements had a greater presence in the Egyptian media and Islamic 
movements were widely defamed, the Islamists made impressive electoral gains in both 
countries (Al-Fegiery 2006).  
Despite, improved access to the media during the elections the Muslim Brothers 
were cut off from these benefits. The Muslim Brothers are only allowed to perform in 
media that covers only a small group of the population, either in English newspapers or 
on satellite TV. According to al-Houdaiby:  
[On Al-Ahram weekly] English outlets have more freedom and are less censored, 
because they do not target the nation the same way as Arabic newspapers. The 
government members might talk in less negative terms about the brotherhood for 
instance in English newspapers. Al Jazeera used Essam al-Erian from Muslim 
Brotherhood in a debate program once. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood are 
never allowed on national TV, they are not allowed to appear to the masses. Even 
though Al Jazeera is in Arabic it is not for the masses, not everybody can afford 
satellite TV” (Al Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.). 
The Muslim Brothers have never had their own newspaper or media outlet to express 
their political program; this is another paradox considering that the Muslim Brothers is 
the biggest opposition party in Parliament. This can be explained by two factors; first the 
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cooperation with other parties and second, the new media strategy of the Muslim 
Brothers to make use of new technology and the internet. In addition to these two factors 
it has been explained that all the negative publicity and attack on the Muslim Brothers in 
newspapers helps spreading their message and also increasing curiosity driving more 
people to find out more about them.  
Cooperation with Other Political Parties 
In the Mubarak era, the Muslim Brothers has mainly relied on their political allies in 
order to publish their political messages and program. Both the Liberal and Labor parties 
provide a media platform for the Brotherhood, disseminating the Islamist message.  In 
the 1980s several independent Islamic periodicals emerged. Foremost among them was 
al-Sha’b, the weekly newspaper of the Labour party, which became increasingly Islamist 
in tone as the Labour party allied with the Muslim Brothers. In addition the Muslim 
Brothers write articles in Al-Haqiqa and Al-‘Usra al-‘Arabiyya, both operated by the 
Liberal Party.  
In the early 1990s, Islamic newspapers and journals available on the Egyptian 
market spanned a wide ideological spectrum, from the government-produced newspaper 
al-Liwa’ al-islami, to the Brotherhood journals Liwa’ al-islam and al-I’tisam, to the 
eclectic al-Sha’b , the mouthpiece of the Islamist-oriented Labour Party. Despite their 
different orientations vis-à-vis the regime (which ranged from supportive to sharply 
critical), Wickham observes that regardless of its source, the printed media tended to 
promote a socially conservative version of Islam, in part as an outcome of Saudi 
influence”. (Wickham 2003: 135). 
Many of the newspapers that the Muslim Brotherhood publishes articles have been 
shut down, and new ones started. A couple of weeks before I went to Egypt Afaq 
Arabya, al-Ahrar newspaper, was shut down, it was not officially published by the 
Muslim Brothers, but everybody knew that it was a Brotherhood newspaper, of the Hizb 
al-Ahrar, the Liberal party. Al-Houdaiby argues that so far the Muslim Brothers press 
has been very traditional and conservative “not in terms of not liberal, but not 
confrontational. It is not confrontational, not really critical of the regime, and this is 
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what the people want right now, people want someone to tell them don’t be afraid” (Al 
Houdaiby: interview 29.04.06.) 
The Muslim Brothers Media Strategy 
The Muslim Brothers are far from invisible in the media despite the restrictions on their 
access to media, especially since 2005. First, as mentioned above that the government 
and other critical of the Muslim Brothers spend much time and space in the media to 
condemn and criticize the Islamic movement, giving the Brothers free attention. But 
even more, the Muslim Brothers is strategically using the limited opportunities open to 
them.  
The first strategy is that the Muslim Brothers have made themselves very 
accessible to the media, both nationally and international, they are more than willing to 
be interviewed in newspapers and on TV. They see this as a golden opportunity to 
express their reform program and to communicate their performance in parliament. I saw 
many interviews with the Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Akif in glossy English 
magazines during my fieldwork. In relation to this, the Muslim Brothers also publish 
articles in regional and international newspapers in both Arabic and English, as a second 
strategy. The Muslim Brotherhood also has dialogues with for instance Carnegie. They 
made 47 interviews in al-Jazeera, al,Arabia, Dream, orbit, al-‘Alam and al-Hurra 
channels and distributed 163 periodicals through the members’ premises in the 
governorates. In addition they released 352 articles to foreign and national newspaper.  
The second strategy is to arrange pressconferences and publish press releases in 
relation to their parliamentary performance. In 2006 the Muslim Brothers held press 
conferences on cases in the Parliament e.g. when the emergency law was expanded for 
another two years, on the government reactions on the bird flu disaster and on the 
authority of the judicial authority.  
The final strategy is extensive use of internet, both in producing and actively using 
webpages, in Arabic and English, and lately, many Ikhwan members have established 
internet blogs to state their political opinions and participating in political debates on the 
internet. The Arabic webpage, www.ikhwanonline.com, has a popular image to appeal 
to common Egyptians, in terms of use of Islamic symbols and colors – green. Prior to 
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the elections in 2005 the Brothers launched an English website www.ikhwanweb.com. It 
is observed that these sites “put anything else by any other political force in Egypt to 
shame, including anything produced by the government” (Al-Amrani 2005). The design 
reminds of the webpages of the BBC, with breaking news running over the screen. They 
cover all aspects of the political activities of the Muslim Brothers.  
On these pages they publish their political program and their focus on reform. 
Interviews of their members published in other newspapers are also published here. All 
kind of comment of their activities from criticism and complimentary articles are 
published, from national and international media, written of intellectuals, academics and 
politicians. In these days they publish an ongoing debate between the Carnegie 
Foundation and themselves on their own Islamic project. “Exploring the Grey Zones”. 
They show that they are willing to discuss and argue for their political program and 
strategies. This webpages gives the impression that the Muslim Brothers is, and want to 
be considered, serious and professional, dynamic and modern. 
In addition to signal to the world that they are serious and not secretive movement 
with real visions for Egypt and that they are dynamic adjusting to and interfering with 
the rest of the world. According to al-Houdaiby (interview 29.04.06.) this new media 
strategy is also to eradicate fear, both of the Western observers to understand their 
message and the Egyptians that they should not be afraid when the Muslim Brothers is 
increasing their confrontational strategies towards the regime. 
Summary 
In the Mubarak era the Muslim Brothers has made strategies in order to gain access to 
the political society, without compromising existing rules, even tolerating nonexistent 
democratic principles for power rotations and pluralism. This chapter has focused on 
three main strategies; parliamentary elections, performance in parliament and the use of 
the media. In this chapter I have tried to answer the second sub-question of the problem 
statement: why do the Muslim Brothers, despite political and judicial hindrances, work 
within the formal political system? This question encourages the researcher to look 
beyond the formal political structures. The question implies that there must be some 
kind of opportunity structures in the political society or else it would be futile. I have 
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operationalized four opportunity structures that are determinant to the various strategies 
of the Muslim Brothers.  
First, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression means the judicial set of 
rules to control political parties and opposition movements, as well as the state’s use of 
force as deterrent. The Egyptian regime’s propensity for repression is very strong. The 
overarching emergency law gives the Egyptian regime authority to regulate most 
political activity. The capacity is another question, when we look at the success of the 
Muslim Brothers. First, the Muslim Brothers has decided to not consider themselves 
illegal, this complicates the regime’s capacity to control to a certain degree. According 
to al-Erian  
We do not consider our self illegal, at all. We work according to law and the 
constitution, we participate in every election we can according to the rule. On the 
other side, the Government, off course, considers us as outlaw. We have had 
an ongoing debate over thirty years in the Administrative Council about this. 
Till now the debate is not ended, we have a case, but they do not want to 
have a verdict in this case (Al Erian: interview 02.05.06.).  
Nevertheless, there are three more factors that further obscure the regime’s capacity for 
control and repression; the electoral laws, the cooperation with other parties and the use 
of media.  
The second dimension is the electoral law which has been constantly changed in 
the Mubarak era with various forms of party list and independent system. Despite the 
political parties law restricts the number of legal parties; the election laws have made 
opportunities for illegal parties to take part in elections, to a limited degree. Without the 
help of other parties the Muslim Brothers would not succeed in the elections in the 
1980s. Over the past twenty years a series of court decisions has forced the regime to 
constantly shift its methods. Parties denied a license, with the Muslim Brothers in front, 
have sometimes successfully appealed to administrative courts to win legal recognition. 
Egypt’s Supreme Court has ruled that political independents have a right to compete for 
office, thus invalidating electoral systems based on party lists. This ruling has 
undermined the ability of the regime to keep some parties out of electoral competition; it 
has also weakened the control of the regime’s National Democratic Party (NDP) over its 
own members; those denied party nomination have regularly sought election as 
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independents and then successfully gained readmission to party anxious to retain its 
parliamentary majority. Convinced that the rules were stacked against them, most 
opposition parties lost interest in parliamentary elections, with boycotts becoming 
common over the part decade. For the 2000 parliamentary elections, the regime was hit 
with a particularly inconvenient judicial ruling. The Supreme Constitutional Court held 
that the constitution mandated full judicial supervision over the balloting itself. This 
ruling necessitated voting to be spread out over a period of weeks (because of the limited 
number of judges). It also forced the regime to move some of its most heavy-handed 
techniques outside the polling place. “The methods were so extreme that the elections 
did little to enhance the regime’s democratic credentials” (Hamzawy & Brown 
December 2005). In these days, the regime feels threatened by the strong showing of the 
Muslim Brothers that it is considering to change the electoral system back to the party 
list system. In addition a revision of the political party law is also considered to restrict 
formation of parties to not only based on religion but also with religious references 
(marjyy’a), but nothing is yet decided. 
This brings us to the third dimension which is legal and illegal political 
collaborators. Interestingly liberal, socialist and center parties have and still do cooperate 
with the Muslim Brothers on various bases. The Muslim Brothers would have more 
trouble finding collaborators if it did not have a strong negotiation basis, it enjoyed and 
enjoys popular support and has organizationally skilled members. With the strong 
presence in the Parliament, the Muslim Brothers has proved more independent in 
elections; however it is still dependent on the opposition parties to bring about political 
reform. Further, if the regime decides to tighten the election laws, the Muslim Brothers 
has to make new alliances for taking part in the elections.  The judiciary has also proved 
to be an important collaborator for the Muslim Brothers when it comes to changing the 
election laws in favor of the Muslim Brothers. 
The fourth dimension is the access to the Media. Again in theory the Muslim 
Brothers are banned to express themselves in media, but with cooperation with other 
actors they find opportunities to get visible. New technology and the internet have eased 
their access to the broad masses, even though the regime makes efforts to block the 
internetpages, the Muslim Brothers find alternative channels.  
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What can we learn from these findings? Why do the Muslim Brothers, despite 
political and judicial hindrances, work within the formal political system? First, despite 
the structures of a partial semi-corporate autocracy, the regime does in fact provide 
opportunity structures, which makes it unnecessary for the Muslim Brothers to 
circumvent the political system to realize their political goals. Further, at present the 
opportunity structures does only open up for competition for the parliament for the 
Muslim Brothers. The Parliament, under control of the president and the government, is 
merely considered a rubberstamp organ; however the Muslim Brothers has realized that 
it is nevertheless a place to make public statements and to get indirect influence. Last, 
but not least, operating in the political society gives the Muslim Brothers an opportunity 
to show that they are serious in their work to bring about reform and that they in general 
are sincere actors playing by the rules.  
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5. Conclusions 
Before we make concluding remarks on the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers, 
a brief summary of the relationship between the context and case, political society and 
the Muslim Brothers will follow. 
Looking back at the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian 
state in the Mubarak era, we can divide this time span in at least three stages. The first 
stage is most of the 1980s, from the assassination of President Sadat, in 1981, until about 
1988. The state wanted to break the ice with Islamic actors in society, and the Muslim 
Brothers were tolerated, but disregarded. The Brotherhood was enjoyed to a large degree 
free movement and expression, without being granted any official acknowledgement of 
the legitimacy of its existence. In this period the Muslim Brothers made cautious efforts 
to participate in the political society, running with other parties in the Parliamentary 
elections, and in the semi-political society, such as professional syndicates and student 
unions.  
The parliamentary election in 1987, uncovered the political potential of the 
Brotherhood, in alliance with both Al-Amal (Labor) and Al-Ahrar (Liberals) parties, 
under the banner of “Islam is the Solution”. The second phase of the Brothers’ 
relationship to the state began, now the state became more wary of the political potential 
of the Muslim Brothers and this uncertainty resulted in friction between the two, as the 
state started trying to interrupt the advance of the Brotherhood inside the professional 
syndicates through freezing some of them, and raising problems inside others, while the 
Brotherhood started acting as a semi-legitimate power in the country. 
In 1992 the Brotherhood took hold of the Bar association board which during 
history has been a bastion of the liberal and governmental trends, which led the state to 
get alarmed. Later the same year, the most aggressive wave of Islamic violence, which 
was carried out by both “Islamic Group” and “al-Jihad” broke out, during which the 
state blamed the Brotherhood for not condemning them. These two events worsened the 
relationship between the Brotherhood and the state, leading to the next stage, which 
started in the beginning of 1993 and has continued until now, a period characterized with 
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deterioration and clash. The rest of the 1990s the Muslim Brothers kept a low profile, 
due to the harsh clampdowns by the regime. In the parliamentary elections in 2000, the 
Muslim Brothers won 17 seats, which was the more than the other opposition parties 
combined. Followed by the 9/11 in 2001 the Egyptian regime intensified its campaigns 
against the Muslim Brothers. Nevertheless, increased repression in terms of detentions 
and persecution did not prevent the Muslim Brothers to become the biggest and most 
serious opposition party in parliament. 
How can we understand the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers in this 
political context? 
The Political Capacities of the Muslim Brothers 
The political capacities of the Muslim Brothers are understood as the abilities and 
opportunities of the Muslim Brothers to operate in the political society. In this thesis 
ability is related to their political goals and strategic choices. Opportunity is the 
openings in the political system to apply the strategies to gain influence to achieve their 
goals. The capacities are the abilities to apply the opportunities.  
The first sub-question of the problem statement is: how do political obstacles and 
opportunities in the formal political system affect and shape the goals and strategies of 
the Muslim Brothers in Egypt? In authoritarian regimes, the political opportunities are 
volatile and unanticipated, and contextual factors have a considerable impact on the 
goals and strategies of political actors, which will also adjust their goals according to 
what they can expect to achieve, in a short-term and long-term perspective. In chapter 3 
the political goals of the Muslim Brothers were represented. The goals are divided 
between the programmatic goals and the systemic goals, reflecting what Mainwaring 
(2003) defines as “election games” and “regime game”. Mainwaring defines various 
regime games, but the Muslim Brothers have focused, especially the last couple of years, 
on the “democratic transition game”, which means participating within the political 
process in order to bring about political reforms. They have also attempted on 
“delegitimation game”, boycott of elections to delegitimate the political system, but they 
realized that they can actually achieve more inside than outside the system.  
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In an authoritarian regime, the context is decisive to what goals and strategies to 
prioritize. The Muslim Brothers program reveal that socio-economic and moral-religious 
issues are important political goals, however to achieve these goals they need to make an 
effort to change the regime. The regime game is the means to reach an end which is their 
vision of the political platform. Many years in the political game, experiencing ups and 
down, the Islamic movement has adopted a long-term policy and the Muslim Brothers 
has shown that they are patient and pragmatic in order to reach their goals. In an 
authoritarian regime with an illegal status, the goals of the Muslim Brothers are to 
change the system from within without threatening the regime.  
Despite very limited political rights the Muslim Brothers have recognized that it is 
worth playing the regime game in the core. This leads us to the next sub-question: why 
do the Muslim Brothers, despite political and judicial hindrances, work within the 
formal political system? The political opportunity structures of the Muslim Brothers 
were analyzed in chapter 4. Even though the regime has the propensity to repress the 
Muslim Brothers, they are not fully capable of controlling them, because of various 
reasons. First and foremost the regime denies the Muslim Brothers legal status as a 
political party and put restrictions on their activities as a movement. Nevertheless, 
according to al-Erian:  
The illegal status affects our work in two ways, both positively and negatively. 
Positive because it creates sympathy with us, because the people here do not believe 
in the accusations and charges against us and they feel strongly about supporting us. 
Negatively, the illegal status is preventing us from having open head quarters, 
offices or publishing magazines or news papers or having list for membership and 
invite people to join us openly.” (Al Erian: interview 02.05.06.) 
Further, the judicial system has provided opportunities for participating in the political 
society, because of the changing electoral laws and the law on electoral surveillance. 
This finding contradicts the theory of Lust-Okar, which defines the partial liberalized 
system in Egypt as very stable. The election laws have been changed several times from 
pressures both from the opposition parties as well as the judiciary. Another aspect of the 
regime game is not only that they choose to operate in the political society they even 
choose to do so despite the violent efforts to demotivate the Muslim Brothers: 
One of the basic strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood is its insistence of not giving 
up and continues its work even though it faces a lot of resistance from the regime. 
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A lot of violence erupted in the wake of the Parliamentary elections, explained by 
several observers as a result of government panic at the success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (al-Shatir 2006). “But provocations of a corrupt, oppressive 
government -backed by the most powerful countries in the world – will not 
intimidate either our organization, which has survived for 77 years, or the Egyptian 
people, who have increasingly come to trust us.” (al-Shatir 2006).  
Thirdly, there are other actors in the political society that are willing to cooperate and 
ease the access to the political society. Again, the Lust-Okar’s model fails. In the 1980s 
the Wafd cooperated with the Muslim Brothers, later the socialist and liberal parties. 
During the last two elections the Brothers has not been dependent on other parties to win 
seats in the People’s Assembly, however they are interested in having as many allies in 
bringing about the political reform. Finally, the regime has not eased the Muslim 
Brothers access to the media, however due to globalization, they can express themselves 
in regional and international media as well as they can have their own webpages 
publishing massive information.  
There are at least three reasons for why the Muslim Brothers operates in the 
restricted political society. First, to bring about reform they need to position themselves 
within the political system. Second, to be considered serious political actors and reliable 
replacement of the existing regime, they have chosen to operate in the political society. 
Finally, the Muslim Brothers operates in the political society because there are 
opportunities to get access to the political society by strategically circumventing certain 
rules and to ally with other political actors. 
Now that we have answered the sub-questions we can return to the main research 
question: How can we understand the political capacities of the Muslim Brothers?  
First, on the contrary to what many argue, the partly liberalized system has 
actually provided opportunities for the Muslim Brothers. It seems to be challenging for 
the regime to balance between liberalization and control. They have a self-made image 
of embracing democracy; however they have huge problems in living up to this image. 
The state has considered the political and syndicalistic activities on the one side and the 
harsh wave of Islamic violence, as two aspects of the same phenomenon. This is 
strategic choice because the state considered the banned group as a growing political 
danger threatening its control of ruling in the country, in syndicates and the political 
 92
society. In contrast to what Wickham argues, that the Muslim Brothers have chosen to 
operate outside the political society and focus their political engagement in the socio-
political society, I have showed that the Muslim Brothers have incentives, both in terms 
on opportunities as well as ability to work in the political society.  
Second, the Muslim Brothers has proven that they are serious political actor 
playing by the rules. Until now, the Muslim Brothers have concentrated on the People’s 
Assembly, well aware of the fact that it has very limited political power, because the 
President and his government are the real power holders in Egypt. Nevertheless, they 
have managed to become the most influential opposition party in the parliament, with an 
accomodationist approach cooperating with the other political parities on many political 
issues. However, the Muslim Brothers has not yet achieved any substantial changes 
towards reform. The Muslim Brothers are balancing on a thin edge, trying to get as 
much influence as they can without threatening the regime too much, which will be a 
self destroying act, as it was in the 1940s and 1950s. Working from within the regime, 
playing by the rules it becomes more difficult for the regime to accuse the Muslim 
Brothers of being merely power seekers.  
In his studies of various political movements in Southeast-Asia, Törnquist argues 
that one of the reasons for why these movements failed to “transform their activities into 
votes, good governance, and general political significance” (Törnquist 2002: 135), is 
that they are fragmented and that they do not transform interests and single-issues in to 
political programs. When it comes to the Muslim Brothers it is exactly these elements, 
the elaborated political program and the organizational structure, that are one of the 
movement’s strengths.  
There are two interesting outcomes of the Muslim Brothers political capacities. 
First, the political activities of the Muslim Brothers are seemingly a democratic learning 
process. Their illegal position has made them call for democracy and the insistence on 
playing by the rules, gives them useful insight and experience with the democratic game. 
Second, mainstream crafting of democracies has proved insufficient and at times 
counterproductive (Törnquist 2002: 142), hence democracy from within has proved to 
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be more stable and substantial. Therefore, the political reform efforts of the Muslim 
Brothers seem interesting and promising.  
During the process of writing this thesis the Egyptian regime has tightened the 
control on the Muslim Brothers again. Al-Houdaiby has written an article where he 
expresses his fear of the security forces’ “3 am knock on the door” (Al-Houdaiby 2007), 
because of the intensification of detention of active Muslim Brothers members. 
Nevertheless, they are determined to sustain the repression efforts by the regime for their 
cause, according to al-Houdaiby: 
We are willing to pay the price and take the risks, not only for ourselves, but for 
Egypt. At the moment there is nobody except the Muslim Brotherhood that is 
willing to pay the price for fighting for political freedom. Official parties, or the 
legal parties, are not willing to pay the price. I know some of them, some of their 
leaders and some of their members, saying they are willing to pay the price, but not 
to go to prison. We are willing to do anything for this country, so this is the 
difference between Muslim Brotherhood and other parties. This is also one of the 
reasons, that people love the Brotherhood more than they love other parties, 
because they see our sincerity, calling for the peoples’ rights and not our rights, we 
are paying our price for the people willingly, we are not demanding anything in 
return. Now people vote for us, we want the people to enjoy their rights, and when 
they enjoy their rights they will make conscious decisions of what they want. We 
have been used to paying the price for opposing the regime, in 1954, 20 000 
members were detained in 30 minutes. The organization is always growing 
stronger, because we are sincere in what we are doing. We really want the well 
being of our people, we are not part of the political plot which use everything to 
come to power of personal interest, we really love our people and , and we are 
willing to pay the price to see our people live a happier life.” (Al-Houdaiby: 
interview 29.04.06.). 
The Way Ahead 
At present, excluding non-violent Islamist from the political sphere only serves to 
weaken the chances of democratic transformation in the region. Today, the Muslim 
Brothers is a force for serious political reform in Egypt, but also one that need to be 
clear about questions related to their religious agenda, especially questions on Shari’ah, 
their dual political and religious identify, organization and leadership, citizenship and 
women (Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown 2007). 
However, the impact of the Brotherhood on the Egyptian political system depends 
in large part on how the regime decides to respond to the movement’s further moves. 
The shape of politics and the fate of political reform will be determined in no small part 
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by how the Muslim Brothers uses its position as well as the relationship that develops 
between the movement and the regime (Hamzawy & Brown December 2005). During 
the last months, the Muslim Brothers assurance and offensive performance in parliament 
as well as in the student and labor unions have become a trouble for the Egyptian 
regime. According to Hamzawy and Brown: 
At least for the next five years, Egyptian politics will be dominated by the 
relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s 
rise can support Egyptian democratization, but only if the regime and the 
Brotherhood leadership avoid full confrontation.” (Hamzawy & Brown December 
2005).  
The uncertainty about Islamic parties becoming legitimate democratic actors stems from 
limited experience. The only Islamic parties gaining power democratically is AKP52 in 
Turkey and Hamas53 in Palestine, and the experience is still recent. Historically Islamists 
have come to power with undemocratic means and not democratic rule, as in Iran, Sudan 
and Afghanistan. (Hamzawy, Ottaway & Brown February 2007). However, there are 
many examples on Islamic participation in politics, usually as opposition groups, 
respecting the rules governing their participation in politics, even if these rules are 
restrictive and unfair. The Middle East and Egypt in particular is a dynamic scene for 
political change and it is necessary to regard Islamic movements and parties as serious 
actors in democratization processes. These processes have important impact on the 
general development in the region, and it is exciting to follow the further progress. 
 
                                                   
52 The Justice and Development Party, a moderate Islamist, right-wing, conservative party, in power since 
2002. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the leader.  
53 The Islamic Resistance Movement, in power since 2006.  
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